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The Depressed Decision Maker: The Application of Decision Science to
Psychopathology
Abstract
Is decision making impaired in mental illness populations? Can behavioral economics provide insight into
clinical psychology? The present project addresses these broad questions through three studies. In the
first study, two meta-analyses were conducted of experiments that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to
assess value based decision making in populations with mental illness. In the first meta-analysis (63
studies, combined N = 4,978), we compared IGT performance in healthy populations and populations with
mental illness. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, combined N = 1,813), we examined raw IGT
performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first meta-analysis demonstrated that
individuals with mental illness performed significantly worse than did healthy control individuals. The
second meta-analysis demonstrated no performance differences based on type of mental illness.
Impairment on the IGT, however, could indicate effects from several different decision processes.
Accordingly, in the second study, using multiple decision tasks we explored different aspects of decision
making in a single group that exhibited reliable effects in the meta-analysis, major depressive disorder.
The second study answers three questions. First, how does decision making differ in clinically depressed
individuals across a range of decision tasks? Second, where are the largest differences between clinically
depressed and non-depressed individuals? And finally, how well can decision task performance
discriminate depressed individuals from healthy controls? Depressed individuals' decision-making was
significantly different across a range of decision tasks, but impaired learning and pessimism bias showed
the strongest behavioral signature of depression. Decision tasks significantly predict depression, but are
far outperformed by self-report measures as diagnostic tools. Overall, results suggest decision tasks are
better suited to identify specific impaired processes rather than for diagnostic prediction. This study
suggested depression is associated with impaired reward and punishment processing, but what are the
underlying causes behind these deficits? In the third study, we performed a detailed analysis of reward
and punishment learning in clinically depressed individuals, quantifying choice behavior by fitting
reinforcement learning models. The results suggest that depression is characterized by hyposensitivity to
reward. The reinforcement learning models show that depressed individuals engage habit-oriented
model-free learning strategies in contrast to the goal-oriented model-based strategies engaged by healthy
controls. Overall the three studies demonstrate how interdisciplinary research combining decision
science and clinical psychology can help to better understand mental illness.
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ABSTRACT

THE DEPRESSED DECISION MAKER: THE APPLICATION OF DECISION
SCIENCE TO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Dahlia Mukherjee
Joseph W. Kable
Is decision making impaired in mental illness populations? Can behavioral
economics provide insight into clinical psychology? The present project addresses these
broad questions through three studies. In the first study, two meta-analyses were
conducted of experiments that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value based
decision making in populations with mental illness. In the first meta-analysis (63 studies,
combined N = 4,978), we compared IGT performance in healthy populations and
populations with mental illness. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, combined N =
1,813), we examined raw IGT performance scores as a function of type of mental illness.
The first meta-analysis demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed
significantly worse than did healthy control individuals. The second meta-analysis
demonstrated no performance differences based on type of mental illness. Impairment on
the IGT, however, could indicate effects from several different decision processes.
Accordingly, in the second study, using multiple decision tasks we explored different
aspects of decision making in a single group that exhibited reliable effects in the metaanalysis, major depressive disorder. The second study answers three questions. First, how
does decision making differ in clinically depressed individuals across a range of decision
tasks? Second, where are the largest differences between clinically depressed and noniv

depressed individuals? And finally, how well can decision task performance discriminate
depressed individuals from healthy controls? Depressed individuals’ decision-making
was significantly different across a range of decision tasks, but impaired learning and
pessimism bias showed the strongest behavioral signature of depression. Decision tasks
significantly predict depression, but are far outperformed by self-report measures as
diagnostic tools. Overall, results suggest decision tasks are better suited to identify
specific impaired processes rather than for diagnostic prediction. This study suggested
depression is associated with impaired reward and punishment processing, but what are
the underlying causes behind these deficits? In the third study, we performed a detailed
analysis of reward and punishment learning in clinically depressed individuals,
quantifying choice behavior by fitting reinforcement learning models. The results suggest
that depression is characterized by hyposensitivity to reward. The reinforcement learning
models show that depressed individuals engage habit-oriented model-free learning
strategies in contrast to the goal-oriented model-based strategies engaged by healthy
controls. Overall the three studies demonstrate how interdisciplinary research combining
decision science and clinical psychology can help to better understand mental illness.
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INTRODUCTION
Research in mental illness is beginning to shift emphasis from a symptom-based
focus to a more process-based one (Sanislow et al., 2010). Mental illness is currently
organized according to clinical syndromes, but critics of this approach point to notable
heterogeneity within syndromes and overlapping features across syndromes. As an
alternative to the syndrome approach, psychologists are increasingly studying—and
sometimes even treating—basic processes that cut across traditional mental-illness
categories. This crosscutting approach has begun to shape funding priorities at the National
Institute of Mental Health, for example, through the recently introduced Research Domain
Criteria (RDoC) proposal (Insel et al., 2010).
The present series of studies examines whether the process of value-based decisionmaking deserves to be included in the psychopathology-process list. We use the term valuebased decision-making to denote the set of processes that is the object of study in
behavioral and experimental economics and in the psychology of decision-making
(including consumer behavior). We use this term to distinguish value-based decisionmaking both from the cognitive psychology of reasoning and judgment and from the
psychophysical study of perceptual decisions. Behavioral economics examines
psychological aspects of decision making by assessing the influence of social, cognitive,
and emotional factors on individual economic decisions. These psychological influences
affect decision-making in a way that can be captured mathematically through
computational modeling techniques. The application of these tasks and techniques to
psychopathology has created an emerging new field called computational psychiatry.
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Two kinds of evidence suggest that processes involved in value-based decisionmaking might be affected by mental illness. First, the neural circuitry implicated in valuebased decision making overlaps with that known to be impaired in mental illness. Studies
on the neuroscience of value-based decision making have focused on the fundamental role
of medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amygdala, and the modulatory
neurotransmitter systems that project to these regions (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable,
2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010). It is interesting that these
very same regions also demonstrate neurochemical and functional disruption in different
mental illnesses (e.g., Dom, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Van Den Brink, 2005; Verdejo-García &
Bechara, 2009; Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006), including obsessivecompulsive disorder (OCD; Cavedini et al., 2002;Lawrence et al., 2006); depression
(Grecius et al., 2007; Mayberg, 2006; Murphy et al., 2001); alcohol, cocaine, and stimulant
abuse (Bechara et al., 2001; Volkow & Fowler, 2000); pathological gambling (Brand et al.,
2005); and personality disorders (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000).
Second, there is some empirical evidence for differences in value-based decision-making
between individuals with mental illness and healthy control individuals, with examples in
schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007), OCD (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003),
substance dependence (Bechara et al., 2001; Bickel & Marsch, 2001), and depression
(Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 2009).
However, despite the evidence favoring research on value based decision-making
and psychopathology, certain questions remain. First, is value-based decision making
really impaired in mental illness populations? There are qualitative reviews implicating
2

impairment in specific disorders but no quantitative review summarizing such a
conclusion. In Study 1, we conducted quantitative meta-analyses to answer two main
questions: (a) whether people with mental illness display significantly impaired valuebased decision-making relative to healthy individuals, and (b) whether there are any
differences in value-based decision-making across populations with different mental
illnesses. The answers to these questions should inform the prospects for computational
psychiatry—that is, whether or not researchers should study value-based decision making
in mental illness at all and, if so, for which mental illnesses these studies might prove most
important.
The first study addresses whether or not decision-making is indeed impaired in
mental illness. Assuming that is the case, how can decision-making research potentially
add value to the existing psychopathology literature. Based off the RDoC proposal, two
areas where process based research may be useful are as classification tools and/or
identifying signature behavioral markers of psychopathology. In study 2 we aim to assess
value-based decision-making in a clinically depressed population with three objectives: (1)
to assess potential differences in decision-making in depressed individuals compared to
healthy controls, (2) to identify the largest differences in decision-making between
depressed individuals and healthy controls, as well as potential underlying latent factors of
decision-making, and (3) to determine the predictive accuracy of decision performance as
a potential diagnostic tool.
The previous study addresses whether decision-making performance is similarly
impaired across decision tasks or whether type of decision task leads to variable decision
3

performance. The next step investigates the underlying causes where decision performance
is most compromised. Based on the results in Study 2 and literature supporting impaired
reinforcement learning in depressed individuals, Study 3 was designed to examine the
cause of reinforcement learning deficits in clinically depressed individuals. We analyzed
reinforcement-based decision-making behavior of individuals diagnosed with depression
in detail, quantifying and modeling choice behavior using reinforcement learning models.
The results may inform future directions for assessment and treatment of depression.
The overarching goal of the three studies is to establish whether the process of
decision-making can serve to inform and explain psychopathology in a way that is both
meaningful and useful in the field of clinical psychology. In short, these preliminary
investigations probe the scope and possible future direction of the study of decision-making
in clinical psychology.
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CHAPTER 1: VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IMPAIRMENTS IN MENTAL
ILLNESS: A META ANALYSIS

Abstract
In this study, we assessed value-based decision-making in individuals diagnosed
with mental illness. Two meta-analyses were conducted of studies that used the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value-based decision-making. In the first meta-analysis
(63 studies, n = 4978), we compared IGT performance in healthy and mental illness
populations. In the second meta-analysis (40 studies, n = 1813), we examined raw IGT
performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first meta-analysis
demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed significantly worse than
healthy controls. The second meta-analysis demonstrated no performance differences
based on type of mental illness. These findings suggest that value-based decision-making
is a promising target for transdiagnostic analyses of processes that go awry in mental
illness. A critical priority for future work, given that impairment in the IGT could arise
from changes in several decision processes, will be to investigate the specific decision
processes affected in different mental illnesses.

5

Value-Based Decision-Making Impairments in Mental Illness: A Meta-analysis
Research in mental illness is beginning to shift emphasis away from disorder
symptoms towards basic processes that can go awry across several disorders (Sanislow et
al., 2010). Mental illness is currently organized according to clinical syndromes, but
critics of this approach point to notable heterogeneity within syndromes and comorbidity
and overlapping features across syndromes (for a more detailed review see Follette,
1996). As an alternative to the syndrome approach, psychologists are increasingly
studying—and sometimes even treating—basic processes that cut across traditional
mental illness categories. This crosscutting approach has begun to shape funding
priorities at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), for example, through the
recently introduced research domain criteria (RDoC) proposal (Insel et al., 2010).
Within a process framework, one category of processes that might be worth
investigating is the set involved in “value-based decision-making.” We use the term
value-based decision-making to denote the set of processes that is the object of study in
behavioral and experimental economics and in the psychology of decision-making
(including consumer behavior). We use this term to distinguish value-based decisionmaking both from the cognitive psychology of reasoning and judgment and from the
psychophysical study of perceptual decisions.
Two kinds of evidence suggest that processes involved in value-based decisionmaking might be impacted by mental illness. First, the neural circuitry implicated in
value-based decision-making overlaps with that known to be impaired in mental illness.
6

Studies on the neuroscience of value-based decision-making have focused on the
fundamental role of medial frontal and orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amygdala, and the
modulatory neurotransmitter systems that project to these regions (Bartra, McGuire &
Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007, 2009; Rangel & Hare, 2010). Interestingly, these
very same regions also demonstrate neurochemical and functional disruption in different
mental illnesses (e.g. Dom, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & Van Den Brink , 2005; Verdejo-García &
Bechara, 2009; Verdejo-García, Pérez-García, & Bechara, 2006), including OCD
(Cavedini et al., 2002; Lawrence et al., 2006), depression (Murphy et al., 2001; Grecius
et al., 2007; Mayberg, 2006), alcohol, cocaine and stimulant abuse (Volkow & Fowler,
2000; Bechara et al., 2001), pathological gambling (Brand et al., 2005) and personality
disorders (Raine et al., 2000). Second, there is some empirical evidence for differences in
value-based decision-making between those with mental illness and healthy controls,
with examples in schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007), OCD (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, &
Foa, 2003), substance dependence (Bechara et al., 2001; Bickel & Marsh, 2001), and
depression (Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 2009).
This theoretical and empirical evidence has led some researchers to propose that
studies of value-based decision-making hold much promise for disentangling the
fundamental processes that go awry in different forms of mental illness. Previous work
on value based-decision-making in healthy individuals provides exactly the right tools –
both key theoretical constructs and the laboratory tasks to measure them – needed for this
effort. Montague and colleagues (2012) have even coined a name for this nascent field,
“computational psychiatry,” and reviewed some of the early studies employing this
7

research approach (for further qualitative reviews see also Cavedini, Gorini, & Bellini,
2006; Sevy et al, 2007).
Although there is reason for excitement about computational psychiatry, there
also remains significant uncertainty about how fruitful this research strategy might prove
to be. Most studies have compared a single mental illness population with healthy
controls. The studies to date often involve small sample sizes, and this lack of power has
lead to inconsistencies across studies, meaning that it is unclear whether value-based
decision-making is indeed impaired in mental illness. Furthermore, given that most
studies only investigate a single clinical group, and different studies use different tasks, it
is unclear whether some forms of mental illness, compared with others, might
demonstrate more impairment in value-based decision-making. We conducted
quantitative meta-analyses to answer these two main questions, namely: (a) whether
people with mental illness display significantly impaired value-based decision-making
relative to healthy individuals, and (b) whether there are any differences in value-based
decision-making across different mental illness populations. The answers to these
questions should inform the prospects for computational psychiatry – that is, the extent to
which researchers should study value-based decision-making in mental illness at all, and
if so, for what mental illnesses these studies might prove most important.
To answer these questions, our meta-analyses focus on the one task sensitive to
value-based decision-making processes which has been used widely across all types of
mental illness, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; see methods for full description of the
criteria and search procedure used to select the IGT). The IGT is a standardized
8

instrument that assesses decision-making in ambiguous situations (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In the IGT, individuals choose cards from among four
decks (decks labeled A, B, C and D). Choices from two of the four decks (C and D) result
in moderate gains as well as moderate losses. Choices from the other two decks (A and
B) result in much higher gains as well as much higher losses. Consistent choices from
decks C and D result in a net gain, while consistent choices from decks A and B result in
a net loss. Thus decks C and D are considered “advantageous” while A and B are
considered “disadvantageous.” Performance is typically characterized by the number of
choices of the advantageous decks minus the number of choices of the disadvantageous
decks. Participants are unaware of these facts and must learn to maximize their monetary
gain based on the feedback they receive after each choice. Typical performance evolves
during the course of the task, and most healthy participants make more choices from the
advantageous decks by the end of the task.
As this description should make clear, the IGT taps into many different aspects of
value-based decision-making, including one’s tolerance for risk and ambiguity (Holt &
Laury, 2002; Ellsburg, 1961; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010), the
degree to which one weights losses versus gains (Kahenman & Tversky, 1979), and how
well one learns on the basis of positive and negative feedback (Schönberg, Daw, Joel, &
O'Doherty, 2007; Vaidya, Knutson, O'Leary, Block, Magnotta, 2007; Pessiglione,
Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). This limits the IGT’s specificity in terms of the
target decision process affected (at least, when overall performance is analyzed as in the
studies we review, as opposed to studies that have used computational modeling to tease
9

apart these various factors, e.g., Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011;
Fridberg et al., 2010; Weller, Levin, & Bechara, 2010). However, the flip side of this lack
of specificity is sensitivity to many different aspects of value-based decision-making.
This sensitivity is useful for our purpose, which is to assess whether value-based
decision-making processes are impaired at all in mental illness and to compare the degree
of any impairment broadly across different mental illnesses. The IGT can thus serve to
screen for potential impairments in value-based decision-making, and therefore provides
a sensible starting point for the first quantitative comparison of value-based decision
making across mental illnesses.
We performed two meta-analyses across all studies that used the IGT to assess
decision-making in a mental illness population. The first meta-analysis looked at effect
sizes for comparisons between healthy individuals and those with mental illness. We
were particularly interested in whether there was a significant effect across all mental
illnesses, and whether effect sizes reliably differed across disorders. A follow-up metaanalysis evaluated the raw scores from the IGT across different mental illnesses, rather
than the differences in performance against matched healthy participants. This metaanalysis allowed a direct comparison of performance across disorders.
Methods
Selection of the IGT
Given that our goal was to assess and compare value-based decision-making
across different forms of mental illness, we first searched for decision-making tasks that
10

had been used widely enough for this purpose. An initial PsychINFO screen through
February 2011 used decision-making and specific disorders as descriptors (e.g., decision
making and obsessive compulsive disorder or OCD). This broad search identified three
value-based decision making tasks that had been widely used in studies of mental illness:
the IGT, the Delay Discounting Task (DDT), and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART). Three further searches were conducted on PsychInfo through February 2011.
The first search used the following descriptors: Delayed Discounting Task or Kirby Delay
Discounting Measure or Temporal Discounting Task or Discounting Task or Probability
Discounting Task. The second search used Balloon Analogue Risk Task or Balloon
Analogue Risk Taking Task as descriptors. The third search used Iowa Gambling Task or
IGT as descriptor. All three searches were restricted to search the adult population
(Keyword = adult). The selection of the final task(s) was based on two criteria – the task
had been used to assess impairment across mental illness categories (e.g., OCD, mood
disorder, eating disorder, substance dependence disorder, pathological gambling,
schizophrenia and personality disorder) and there were at least three independent studies
assessing impairment within each disorder category by using that task. We felt it was
important to compare across mental illnesses with the same exact task, since different
value-based decision-making tasks assess different constructs or combinations of
constructs.
From these searches, we found only one task met our criteria: the IGT. Of the 40
articles reviewed that used the BART, only 3 fulfilled criteria for the present study. Of
the 149 articles reviewed that used the DDT, only populations with substance
11

abuse/dependence were prominently featured (20 articles). A preliminary review of 282
articles using the IGT revealed that it would meet our criteria. Although we had hoped to
compare mental health disorders on more than one task of value-based decision-making,
the IGT provides a sensible starting point for the first quantitative comparison, as this
task was used to initially identify both deficits in brain lesion populations and activations
in functional imaging studies that were later proven relevant to several other tasks that
assess value-based decision making.
Search Procedures
The broad clinical population under investigation prevented the use of specific
and narrow search terms. Hence the behavioral task of interest, the IGT, was used as a
search term and the available literature was assessed with respect to clinical pathology.
Potentially relevant studies were identified via Google Scholar and PsychINFO searches
through January 2012 using the descriptors Iowa Gambling Task or IGT, restricting the
search to the adult population (Keyword = adult).
The database searches were supplemented in several ways to ensure
comprehensiveness. The reference lists of relevant reviews, chapters, and articles were
manually searched for potentially eligible studies. The electronic library of one of the
authors (J.W.K.), who specializes in decision-making, was also searched. From a
provisional list of included studies, four researchers who frequently publish relevant
studies were identified, and Google Scholar and PsychInfo searches were performed
using these authors’ names as search terms. Several steps were also taken to address
12

publication bias. Unpublished dissertations were included in the PsychINFO search. The
four frequent authors identified above were also contacted and asked if they had any
unpublished studies pertinent to the research question. One researcher (Davis, 2011)
provided unpublished data included in the study. Conference abstracts from the Society
for Neuroeconomics (2005-2012), Society for Neuroscience (2000-2012) and Cognitive
Neuroscience Society (2003-2012) were also searched. These abstract searches generated
one additional study (Dolan et al., 2008) that fit all inclusion criteria and was included in
the final meta-analyses.
Studies had to meet the following inclusion criteria to be included in either metaanalysis:
a) The study was published in English (to ensure proper coding).
b) The sample consisted only of adult participants. This ensures comparable
neurodevelopmental baselines across samples.
c) For mental illness diagnosis, only studies using clinical interview methods based
on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; APA,
1994) guidelines were used. Self-report questionnaires could not be the sole
source for establishing diagnosis. This helps improve reliability and validity of a
diagnosis across studies.
For inclusion in the effect size meta-analysis, studies had to additionally include a
comparison group of healthy participants, and report sufficient details for an effect size to
be calculated. For inclusion in the raw score meta-analysis, studies had to include the IGT
net score means and SDs and/or block IGT scores and means for the clinical group under
13

investigation (See Supplement Material for list of references included in both metaanalyses).
Finally, to benchmark the IGT performance of mental illness populations, we
compared their performance with that of brain lesion populations. Only studies using
participants with ventromedial prefrontal cortex or frontal cortex lesions were selected;
studies that included traumatic brain injury (TBI) were excluded. Given their known
impairment on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999;
Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000), this group was included as a comparison to assess
the severity of any deficits in mental illnesses.
Selection of studies
The combined search for both meta-analyses yielded 348 studies, of which 176
were retained for evaluation for inclusion (See Figure 1 and Figure 2). Of these 176
studies, six studied lesion populations and were used for comparison with mental illness
populations. Sixty studies were excluded from both meta-analyses for the following
reasons: described a study which did not include a clinical population (n = 15), did not
include the IGT as one of its decision-making assessment tasks (n = 11), did not use
interview techniques and DSM-IV guidelines to determine mental health diagnosis and/or
relied on self-report measures (n = 19), were repetitions of the same sample described in
another study (n = 5), were review or theoretical articles (n = 7), or included a population
group other than adults (n = 3). For the effect size meta-analysis, 45 additional studies
were excluded because they did not include a healthy adult comparison group (n = 29) or
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they reported inadequate data for the calculation of effect sizes (n = 16). For the raw
score meta-analysis, 69 additional studies were excluded because they reported
inadequate data for the calculation of performance scores. Thus there were 65 articles,
comprising 65 studies, that met criteria for the effect size meta-analysis and 41 articles,
comprising 41 studies, that met criteria for the raw score meta-analysis. When a
secondary source was available for a given study, the primary source was used to
calculate the effect size unless reported data were insufficient. For comparison of effects
sizes, six studies with lesion populations were available. For comparison of raw scores,
only four of these studies were included as the others provided insufficient data to
calculate net mean IGT performance and standard errors for lesion group. One author
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1999, 2000) provided the necessary data for three of the four
studies.
Coding of Studies
Given that one of our central questions was whether IGT performance varies with
type of mental illness, studies were coded for both the specific type of primary mental
health disorder (Obsessive Compulsive Disorders, Mood Disorders, Eating Disorders,
Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse/Dependence Disorders, Pathological Gambling
Disorder, and Personality Disorders) and broadly into personality vs. non-personality
primary disorders. This broad distinction is of interest given the collapsing of Axis I and
II disorders in the current The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Lack of a difference between
personality and non-personality disorders would be in alignment with the collapsing of
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Axis I and II categories in the DSM-5. Studies were also coded for other variables that
could explain heterogeneity in effects and that were consistently reported in all studies.
Since intelligence is known to affect value-based decision-making (Burks, Carpenter,
Goette & Rustichini, 2009), each study was coded for whether an intelligence assessment
was administered, and if intelligence was assessed, whether there was a significant
difference between the clinical and healthy groups. Studies were also coded for whether
the study excluded participants with substance abuse/dependence and whether the study
excluded participants with traumatic brain injury or other neurological impairment (Dom
et al., 2005). Comorbidity between mental disorders could be another important factor, as
could whether individuals with mental health disorders are currently undergoing
treatment and how long the individuals had been diagnosed with the disorder.
Unfortunately, none of these factors were consistently reported across studies and so
these factors could not be examined.
Independence of Effect Sizes
To meet the statistical assumption of independence of effect sizes, we took
several steps to ensure that each study contributed only one effect size to each set of
analyses (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). For example, researchers may publish more than one
article using the same data set or may include data used in a previous publication. Since
this would violate the independence of effect sizes assumption, authors with multiple
publications were contacted to provide information on whether completely independent
clinical samples were recruited if they investigated the same clinical group in more than
one published article. Further, in studies that included multiple clinical populations and a
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single healthy control group, only the clinical population with the largest sample size was
used in the effect size meta-analysis, since including multiple effect sizes calculated from
the same control group would violate the independence assumption. For studies that
subdivided their target clinical population into subgroups (for example, alcohol
dependence with personality disorder and alcohol dependence without personality
disorder) and reported data for each subgroup, the combined means and SDs for those
subgroups were calculated to increase sample size and ensure independence of effect
sizes.
Meta-analytic Procedures and Analyses
Weighted mean effect sizes, heterogeneity analyses and moderator analyses were
conducted using Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, version 2.2.046 (Borenstein, Hedges,
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005). Since the eligible studies used different samples, and
methodologies, considerable heterogeneity of effects was expected. Fixed effect models
assume that the true effect size is the same in all studies, and any variability in effect
sizes between studies is attributed to random error. By contrast, random effects models
assume that the true effect may vary systematically from study to study. Given the
expected dispersion of effect sizes, random effects analyses were used to model two
aspects of the observed variance: random within-study variance and systematic betweenstudy variance. Each effect size was weighted to account for its relative precision based
on the standard error of the effect size (within-study variance) and tau-squared (betweenstudy variance).
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Effect sizes. Effect sizes for between-group comparisons were coded such that a
negative effect size indicated impaired decision-making performance in the clinical group
relative to the control group. Hedge’s g (Hedges, 1981) was employed as a measure of
effect size. The conventions typically used to interpret Cohen’s d can also be applied to
Hedge’s g: an effect size of 0.2 is considered small, 0.5 is considered moderate, and 0.8 is
considered large (Cohen, 1988). For studies that did not provide sufficient data for an
effect size calculation but reported non-significant results, an effect size of zero was
entered (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Given the range of study designs and purposes,
methodological quality was not quantified or used in the weighting of effect sizes.
Raw Scores. For the raw score meta-analysis, performance on the IGT was
expressed as the number of selections of good decks minus the number of selections of
bad decks. Mean scores were calculated. Mean performance can range widely, with
healthy controls typically scoring in the positive range.
Outliers. Final effect sizes or raw scores  3 SD above or below the weighted
mean were identified as outliers. Two outliers were detected (Dolan, Bechara & Nathan,
2007; Dom, de Wilde, Hulstijn & Sabbe, 2007) in the effect size meta-analysis. One
outlier was detected for the raw score meta-analysis (Maurex et al., 2009). The results
below are presented excluding the outliers, such that the final effect size meta-analysis
included 63 studies and the final raw score meta-analysis included 40 studies. The results
presented here did not differ significantly when the outliers were included. Details of the
three studies judged as outliers are still provided in Tables 1 and 2 below.
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Publication bias. Publication bias (also called the “file drawer problem”) presents
a serious challenge for any meta-analysis. Studies with non-significant findings or small
effect sizes have a decreased probability of being published, which can result in inflated
estimates of effect size in meta-analyses of published findings. As detailed above, several
steps were taken in the initial search stage to reduce the potential effect of publication
bias (though admittedly these steps recovered only two unpublished studies).
We also tested statistically for the effects of publication bias in two ways. First, a
funnel plot was created and visually examined. This graph plots the standard error for
each study (determined by the study’s sample size) against the study’s effect size. The
name “funnel plot” comes from the predicted presence of an inverted funnel. Studies with
larger sample sizes provide more reliable estimates of the effect size and therefore should
cluster more tightly around the mean toward the top of the plot, whereas smaller studies
provide more variable estimates and therefore should scatter more widely around the
mean toward the bottom of the plot. In the presence of publication bias, the plot becomes
asymmetrical, typically with fewer small-sample-sized studies than would be predicted
with effect sizes smaller than the mean. The trim-and-fill procedure was then applied to
the funnel plot (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). This procedure calculates the likely number of
missing studies based on the asymmetry in the funnel plot, and produces an effect size
and confidence interval that is adjusted to account for these missing studies. An important
caveat to the use of these procedures is that both funnel plots and the trim-and-fill
procedure assume homogeneity of effect sizes. Heterogeneous datasets violate this
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assumption, so the use of these techniques in such cases (which include the present cases)
should be interpreted with caution.
Publication bias was also examined using classic fail-safe values (Rosenthal,
1979). The fail-safe value determines the number of missing studies with a mean effect of
zero that would need to be added to the analysis before the two-tailed p-value would be
greater than 0.05. Tolerance levels were also calculated based on the equation 5K+10,
(where K is the number of observed studies) proposed by Rosenthal (1979) to determine
what would be considered an unlikely number of non-significant studies.
Homogeneity of effect sizes. The present dataset was tested for homogeneity of
effect sizes using the Q statistic (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and the I2 statistic (Cooper,
2010; Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The Q statistic has a chisquare distribution and tests whether the observed dispersion is significantly larger than
the expected dispersion based on within-study error. A significant Q statistic suggests
that the distribution of effect sizes around the mean is greater than that would be
predicted from sampling error alone. The I2 statistic estimates the percentage of the
variance that is attributable to between-studies variability as opposed to within-studies
sampling error. Generally percentages of I2 = 25, 50, and 75 indicate low, moderate, and
high degrees of heterogeneity, respectively (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman,
2003).
Moderator analyses. Given evidence of substantial heterogeneity of effects sizes,
moderator analyses were conducted on variables that might be associated with study
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effects and were consistently reported across studies (see “Coding of Studies” above).
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted for categorical moderators using a
mixed-effects model for each variable hypothesized to influence the effect size. This
model consisted of a random-effects model, which combined studies within each
subgroup, and a fixed-effect model that combined subgroups to determine the overall
effect. Where applicable, the strength of differences based on moderator analyses was
calculated using Cohen’s d.
Results
Sixty-three studies contributed to the effect size meta-analysis and forty studies to
the raw score meta-analysis. Study and sample characteristics are presented in Tables 1
and 2 respectively.
Results for Effect Size Meta-analysis
The results of the random-effects model for effect size indicate that mental illness
populations performed reliably worse on IGT than healthy controls, with a moderately
large effect size. Individual study effect sizes ranged from 0 to –1.55 (negative effect
sizes indicating impaired performance in the clinical population). The average effect size
was – 0.58 (95% CI – 0.68, – 0.48, p < 0.001). Cohen’s U3 provides an intuitive metric to
comprehend the magnitude of this effect size. A magnitude of – 0.58 implies that 73% of
participants in the clinical population could be expected to perform worse on the IGT
than the mean performance level of healthy controls (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).

21

Although there was evidence of publication bias, the difference between
individuals with mental illness and healthy controls was robust to this bias. The fail-safe
value was 5172, far exceeding the proposed tolerance levels of what would be considered
an unlikely number of non-significant studies (350). The funnel plot was asymmetric
(Figure 3) with absence of potential studies on the lower right hand side of the funnel;
trim-and-fill procedures suggested that 13 studies with effect sizes to the right of the
mean (more strongly positive) were missing. The corrected average effect size based on
the trim-and-fill procedure (Duvall & Tweedie, 2000) was – 0.44 (95% CI – 0.55 - –
0.33).
We expected heterogeneous effect sizes, since the populations comprised diverse
mental illnesses. The Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity among the effect sizes
(p < 0.001). The I2 value indicated moderate levels of heterogeneity, with 60.71% of the
variance in effect sizes attributable to between-study variance.
Since the Q statistic and I2 value indicated significant heterogeneity, an analysis
of potential moderators was conducted to assess whether effect sizes differed on the basis
of study characteristics (Table 3). Neither type of mental illness (Q(6) = 4.60, p = 0.60)
nor personality/other type (Q(1) = 1.79, p = .18, d = .34) was a significant moderator.
However, in the case of personality/other type, lack of power maybe a potential reason
for the lack of significant findings. The trend was for the effect size in non-personality
disorder populations, formerly Axis I disorders, (g = –0.56, n = 60) to be lower than that
in personality disorder populations, formerly Axis II disorders (g = –0.90, n = 3).
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A significant moderator of effect size was the assessment of intellectual
functioning. Studies that did not assess intellectual functioning reported significantly
more impaired decision-making performance (g = –0.86, n = 13) than studies that did
assess intellectual functioning (g = –0.51, n = 50) (Q(1) = 8.58, p = 0.003, d = .35).
Among the 50 studies that assessed intellectual functioning, 18 reported a significant
difference in intellectual performance between the mental illness group and healthy
controls. These 18 studies also used intelligence as a covariate in data analysis, which
may explain why there was no difference in effect size between studies reporting a
significant difference in intellectual functioning (g = –0.53, n = 18) and studies reporting
no difference (g = –0.50, n = 32), (Q(1) =.12, p = 0.72, d = .03).
Neither substance use exclusion (Q(1) = .02, p = 0.90, d = .02) nor exclusion for
TBI (Q(1) = .005, p = .94, d = .02) was found to be a significant moderator of effect
sizes.
Finally, we compared the performance of individuals with mental illness to those
with frontal lobe lesions. We combined the 63 mental illness studies with six studies
involving frontal lesion groups, and did a moderator analysis with type of clinical
population as a moderator (lesion vs. mental illness). Type of clinical population proved
to be a significant moderator (Q(1) = 6.57, p = 0.01, d = .52) with the lesion population
performing significantly worse than the mental illness population. Thus, although the
mental illness group performed significantly worse than the healthy control group, their
deficits were not as large as those with frontal lobe lesions (See Figure 5 for comparison
of the non-personality disorder, personality disorder and lesion groups).
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Results for Raw Score Meta-analysis
Performance on the IGT was quantified as the number of “good” deck choices (C
+ D) minus the number of “bad” deck choices (A + B). For a 100 trials this score can
therefore vary from –100 to 100. Despite high variability in net IGT scores across
populations, the mean net IGT score for healthy controls is usually a high net positive
gain, on the order of 20 (Bechara et al., 1994), with higher scores implying better valuebased decision making strategies. Mean performances for the mental illness population in
individual studies ranged from –6.72 to 10.20. The average performance across all 40
studies was .45 (S.E = .88).
Though there was evidence of publication bias (Figure 4), this did not seem to
have a large effect on mean performance estimates. Trim-and-fill procedures suggested
that 15 studies with raw scores to the right of mean (more strongly positive) were
missing. The corrected average performance was 3.74 (95% CI – 1.93 - – 5.54).
There was evidence for heterogeneity in effects across studies. The Q statistic
indicated significant heterogeneity (p < 0.001). The I2 value indicated high levels of
heterogeneity, with 83.70% of the variance in raw scores attributable to between-study
variance. As both statistics indicated heterogeneity, we again conducted analyses of
potential moderators (Table 4). However, type of mental illness (n = 40) did not explain
the heterogeneity in the IGT mean score (Q (6) = 2.32, p = 0.90). Personality disorders
vs. non-personality disorders did not moderate the effect either (Q (1) = .38, p = 0.54, d =
.84). The direction of the difference was similar to the trend observed in the effect size
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meta-analysis, with non-personality disorder populations (g = 0.57, n = 38) performing
better on the IGT than personality disorder populations (g = – 2.33, n = 2).
Finally, we compared the performance of individuals with mental illness to those
with frontal lobe lesions. We combined the 40 studies of mental illness with four studies
involving lesion groups and conducted a moderator analysis with type of clinical
population as a moderator (lesion vs. mental illness). Type of clinical population proved
to be a significant moderator (Q (1) = 23.35, p < 0.001, d = 6.62) with the populations
with lesions again performing significantly worse than did the population with mental
illness.
Discussion
This quantitative review answers two broad questions. The first is whether or not
individuals with mental illness demonstrate impaired value-based decision-making, as
assessed by the IGT, relative to healthy individuals. The effect size meta-analysis
demonstrated that performance on the IGT is significantly impaired in mental illness
populations, though the effect size is moderate and the deficit not as severe as in the
frontal lesion population. The second question is whether, within the mental illness
group, the severity of impairment differs across types of mental illness. Since different
matched comparison groups might be used for different mental illnesses, the second
meta-analysis, which directly compares the raw scores on the IGT in different mental
illnesses, provides the clearest answer to this question. Surprisingly, the raw score metaanalysis did not demonstrate any significant differences based on type of mental illness.
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The finding that value-based decision-making is significantly impaired in mental
illness may not come as a surprise to most readers. Qualitative reviews of decisionmaking behavior in specific disorders, such as schizophrenia (Sevy et al., 2007),
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Chamberlain et al., 2007), and substance use disorder
(Dom et al., 2005) all align with the present findings. However, qualitative reviews can
fall prey to selection or publication bias, factors that careful, quantitative meta-analyses
can address. To our knowledge, the present study is the first quantitative meta-analysis to
verify that value-based decision-making, as measured by any task, is consistently
impaired in mental illness.
The present study is also novel in comparing value-based decision-making
performance across different mental illnesses. At present, only the IGT has been tested in
a wide enough range of disorders to permit such a comparison. Here our findings are
perhaps more surprising: we do not find strong evidence for differential impairment on
the IGT in different mental illnesses. Diagnosis was not a significant moderator in either
the effect size or the raw score meta-analyses. Before we return to potential explanations
for this lack of differential impairment, we first discuss two potential moderators that we
did observe.
There was significant heterogeneity in size of IGT impairment across studies.
Despite this heterogeneity, however, neither diagnosis nor personality vs. non-personality
type moderated IGT performance in the mental illness group. There was, however, a
trend in both the effect size meta-analysis and the raw score meta-analysis for people
with personality disorders to be more impaired on the IGT than people with other
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disorders. These findings should be interpreted with caution given that only three studies
of personality disorders were included in the first meta-analysis and only two studies
were included in the second. However, future studies focusing on value-based decisionmaking in personality disorders are warranted given the trend in the current findings. The
current findings point to the possibility that people with personality disorders may
experience more severe impairment than those with other disorders. This would be in line
with the fact that personality disorders are more chronic and treatment resistant, while
non-personality disorders usually have a more sudden onset and less prolonged time
course. In fact, the IGT impairment in the small number of personality disorder studies in
our meta-analyses was almost as large as that observed in patients with frontal lobe
lesions, and individual studies of borderline personality disorder and antisocial
personality disorder have uncovered large effects on learning from rewards or
punishments (Rilling, King-Casas, & Sanfey, 2008). Given the comorbidity between
personality disorders and non-personality disorders, our findings also demonstrate the
importance of assessing and reporting comorbidity in future work. Indeed, it is possible
that the IGT impairments observed in people with non-personality disorders in the current
meta-analyses are due in part to comorbid personality disorders.
The second potential moderator, which was significant in the effect size metaanalysis was assessment of general intellectual functioning. Studies assessing intellectual
functioning reported smaller levels of IGT impairment than studies that did not assess
intellectual functioning. Within the studies that did assess intellectual functioning, there
was no difference in the size of IGT impairment between studies that observed a
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significant difference in intellectual functioning and those studies that did not find such a
difference. This is likely because in those studies that did establish a significant
difference, intellectual functioning was used as a covariate while assessing IGT
performance. Thus, when intellectual functioning is not assessed and controlled for, the
degree of decision-making impairment on the IGT appears to be inflated. These findings
suggest that the IGT is sensitive to not just to value-based decision-making processes, but
also to general intellectual abilities. In fact, several researchers have previously suggested
that deficits on the IGT might reflect deficits in basic cognitive abilities like working
memory (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002; Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 2004).
These findings illustrate the importance of assessing and controlling for intellectual
functioning in studies of value-based decision-making. It is critical to note, however, that
even when assessing and controlling for intellectual functioning, impairment on the IGT
is observed in mental illness.
Returning to our central finding, why might there be widespread impairments on
the IGT across all mental illnesses, with no significant evidence for differential
impairments? While this null result (i.e., lack of differential impairment) should be
interpreted with caution, a plausible interpretation arises from recognizing the central
limitation of the current study. The IGT is only one measure, and while this measure is
sensitive to many different processes involved in value-based decision-making (as well as
to some general aspects of intellectual functioning, see above), it is not specific for any
single decision process (Buelow & Sur, 2009). The decision literature distinguishes
between many fine-grained decision processes, including aversion to risk, aversion to
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ambiguity, aversion to loss, and the ability to learn from rewards and punishments
(Schönberg et al., 2007; Vaidya et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2006). Changes in any of
these processes could have effects on IGT performance. Indeed, different groups have
attributed poor IGT performance to a deficit in reversal learning (Fellows, 2007, Fellows
& Farah, 2005), a preference for taking risks (Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006), or
insensitivity to either rewards or punishments (Franken & Muris, 2005). While it is
possible that the impairments observed across different mental illnesses in the current
study are all traceable back to the same underlying process within value-based decision
making, it seems more likely that different mental illnesses impact different decision
processes, but all of these effects lead to poorer performance on the IGT. Our findings
therefore show that across mental illnesses there is impairment within the broad class of
processes involved in value-based decision making to which the IGT is sensitive, but
these findings do not yet identify the specific processes within that broad class that are
affected by specific disorders.
A very promising avenue of future research, then, would be to assess decisionmaking in different mental illnesses using a wider range of tasks that more cleanly isolate
specific decision processes. Studies could use a battery of tasks developed in the decision
literature to assess the specific processes of risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, loss
aversion, reward learning and punishment learning. To focus on two of these constructs,
people might perform poorly on the IGT because they have a lower degree of risk
aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002; Levy et al., 2010). That is, even once they know the
probabilities and the outcomes associated with each deck, they are more willing to choose
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the higher-risk (i.e., higher variance) disadvantageous decks. Alternatively, people might
perform poorly on the IGT because they are slower to learn from rewards and
punishments (Schönberg et al., 2007; Vaidya et al., 2007; Pessiglione et al., 2006). That
is, it takes them a longer time to learn the probabilities and the outcomes associated with
each deck. The decision tasks necessary to dissociate these two possibilities already exist.
In addition, performance on many of these more fine-grained decision tasks has
been associated with specific neural systems. For example, neuroimaging studies using
standard tasks to assess people’s risk preferences have identified neural responses that
scale with risk in the cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and inferior prefrontal cortex, and
these neural responses predict an individual’s degree of risk aversion (Christopoulos,
Tobler, Bossaerts, Dolan, & Schultz, 2009; Rudorf, Preuschoff, & Weber, 2012). In
contrast, individual differences in reward learning have also been identified and these are
associated with neural signals in the ventral striatum that scale with reward prediction
errors (Schönberg et al., 2007).
Therefore, a carefully selected battery of tasks, unlike the IGT alone, would be
capable of identifying the specific “signature” of decision processes affected by a given
mental illness. Comparing these signatures across mental illnesses would then permit
identifying their commonalities and distinguishing features, and would furthermore lead
to testable hypotheses about the neural systems affected by mental illness. Such
investigations might start with those mental illnesses for which there are strong effects in
the current meta-analyses, such as mood or personality disorders. This kind of study
would fall squarely within the current push in clinical psychopathology towards
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transdiagnostic investigations of specific psychological processes. Although such a
research effort would warrant a sizable investment, the current meta-analyses suggest that
such an investment would be highly likely to yield interesting, informative results.
In this light, the current meta-analyses provide a broad “screen” for possible
impairments in value-based decision-making, by assessing IGT performance across
mental illnesses. The obvious next step, given the widespread impairments on the IGT
that we document, is to follow up on this “screen” to identify the specific decision
processes that are impaired in specific disorders. Impaired decision-making is generally
not a focus in psychopathology. Indeed, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) considers decisionmaking impairment a possible symptom for only one disorder, major depressive disorder.
The current meta-analyses suggest that further investigations of value-based decisionmaking in mental illness, along the lines followed in the nascent field of computational
psychiatry (Montague et al., 2012), hold substantial promise for identifying specific
decision processes that are adversely affected across disorders.
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CHAPTER 2: THE DISCRIMINATORY POWER OF DECISION-MAKING: CAN
VALUE-BASED DECISION-MAKING PREDICT AND DETECT IMPAIRED
PROCESSES IN DEPRESSION?
Abstract
Incongruities between research in the biological science and clinical psychology
fields validate the need to investigate underlying process-based mechanisms of mental
illness. One theoretically and empirically studied cognitive process worth exploring is
decision-making. The present study aims to assess value-based decision-making in a
clinically depressed population with three objectives: First, to assess potential differences
in decision-making in depressed individuals compared to healthy controls; second, to
identify potential underlying latent factors of decision-making; and third, to determine the
predictive accuracy of decision performance as a potential diagnostic tool.
Method: 128 individuals (64 clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls) were
recruited. Each participant was administered a structured clinical interview, value-based
decision tasks, an IQ test and several self-report questionnaires. The decision tasks used
were risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, delay discounting, persistence, reward and
punishment learning, the ultimatum game, and the prediction question. Independent ttests were conducted to detect differences between the two groups. Exploratory factor
analysis using promax rotation was conducted to identify potential underlying factors of
decision-making. Logistic regression, including out-of-sample prediction, was used to
estimate the prediction accuracy of decision performance to classify depressed and
healthy individuals.
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Results: Depressed participants performed significantly worse on the punishmentlearning task (p = 0.001, d = .58) and reward learning task (p = .05, d = .37), were more
impatient on the persistence task (p = 0.008, d = .39), made significantly less 50-50
choices in the ambiguity aversion task (p = .04, d =.36), accepted significantly less
money as a responder (p =.03, d =.38) and proposed significantly more as a proposer (p
=.04, d =.52) in the ultimatum game. The depressed group believed they had a
significantly lower probability of winning additional money than the control group (p =
.01, d = .44). Four underlying factors were identified based on decision performance –
myopic decision-making, persistence, uncertainty and pessimism bias. An out of sample
logistic regression using depression task scores as predictors showed a predictive
accuracy of 62%.
Conclusion: Depressed individuals’ decision-making performance was
significantly different from healthy controls across a range of decision tasks. Potential
factors of the decision process were identified and with prediction results showed
learning and pessimism bias as signature behaviors of depression. Decision tasks are
outperformed by self-report measures as predictive diagnostic tools. Overall results
suggest decision tasks are better suited to identify specific processes gone awry rather
than diagnostic prediction.
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The Discriminatory Power of Decision-Making: Can Value-Based Decision-Making
Predict and Detect Impaired Processes in Depression?
How depression impacts decision-making is potentially important to our
understanding of both decision making and psychopathology. As depression affects 6.7%
of the US adult population in a year (Kessler, Wai, Demler, & Walters, 2005), it could
account for sizable heterogeneity across individual decision makers, and would therefore
be of interest to economists or others interested in that heterogeneity. In addition, as
depression is associated with both baseline changes in affect as well as changes in
affective reactivity, the effects of depression on decision-making provide important data
about how affective factors influence decision-making (Bechara, 2003; Bechara, 2004;
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, &
Cohen, 2003a; Schwarz, 2000). Thus, understanding how depressed people make
monetary decisions can advance economics and decision science.
Understanding how depressed people make monetary decisions can also advance
psychopathology. As illustrated for example by the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
(Insel et al., 2010), there is increasing emphasis in psychopathology research on a
nuanced understanding of the processes and mechanisms affected by mental illness,
rather than only superficial clinical symptoms. Decision processes are likely an important
and understudied target for these investigations. For example, a recent meta-analysis of
mental illness and decision-making on one task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT),
demonstrated impaired decision making performance across mental illnesses
(Mukherjee, & Kable, 2014). In addition, the brain regions affected in psychopathology –
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the frontal lobe and associated subcortical structures including the striatum and amygdala
– are the same as those implicated in decision-making behavior. Depression in particular
is associated with impaired functioning in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral
striatum, two regions known to play critical roles in value-based decision-making
(Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Using the conceptual and analytical tools of
decision science to study depression could help to bridge gaps between current research
in clinical psychopathology and neuroscience and behavioral science (Montague, Dolan,
Friston, & Dayan, 2012).
Though several studies have begun to investigate decision making in depression, a
review of the literature highlights some noteworthy gaps. First, we do not have a full
characterization of how value-based decision-making differs in depressed and nondepressed individuals. Studies have demonstrated differences in value-based decisionmaking in depressed individuals on isolated tasks, such as the IGT (Must et al., 2006) or
reward learning. But the full range of decision processes has not yet been surveyed. Are
all aspects of decision-making affected or just some subcomponents? Do depressed
decision makers differ in how they treat uncertainty, delay, or social demands?
Second, given that no study has investigated multiple decision processes in the
same individuals with depression, we do not know yet where the biggest differences in
decision making are between depressed and non-depressed individuals. Looking across a
range of decision tasks could potentially identify and isolate the dimensions of the
decision making processes that are most affected in depressed individuals.
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Finally, we do not know how well we can successfully categorize depressed from
healthy individuals based on decision performance. There is excitement about the
emerging field of “computational psychiatry” (Montague et al., 2012), including the
prospects for using a combination of behavioral tasks and computational models to
predict and classify disorders. One study (Huys, Vogelstein, & Dayan, 2008) examined
the potential of a learning task to classify depressed individuals from healthy controls.
The results demonstrated significant potential. However, no studies have examined the
extent of the predictive accuracy of multiple decision tasks together. How much of the
depression “signal” can measures of decision making detect?
The present study seeks to address these three broad questions. How does valuebased decision making differ in depressed individuals? Are some dimensions/factors of
decision-making impacted more by depression than others? Finally, what is the predictive
accuracy of decision-making as a diagnostic tool? To address these three questions we
administered a battery of value-based decision making tasks to a sample of depressed and
healthy control individuals. The selected tasks measured delayed discounting (Ainslie &
Herrnstein, 1981), willingness to wait (WTW)/ persistence (McGuire & Kable, 2012),
risk tolerance (Holt & Laury, 2002), ambiguity tolerance (Fox & Tversky, 1995), reward
and punishment learning (Murphy, Michael, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2003), and social
preferences using the ultimatum game (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2003).
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Methods
Participants
Between October 2012 and January 2014, 128 participants (64 diagnosed with
current Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and 64 healthy controls) were recruited for
the study. MDD participants were recruited from the Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Health, the Counseling and Psychological Services and the Hospital of the
University of Pennsylvania. A small subset of these individuals (12) agreed to be taped
during the diagnostic interview for reliability purposes. Diagnostic reliability was not
ascertained for the purposes of the present study as more than 80% of the individuals who
participated were being referred after being given a primary diagnosis of MDD for
another clinical study at Penn. Healthy control participants were recruited primarily from
the staff at the University of Pennsylvania and the community through flyers. Based on
an initial phone screen for depression, participants were invited for a diagnostic interview
and participation in the study provided they met criteria. MDD participants were enrolled
if they met the following criteria: (1) diagnostic criteria for current MDD; (2) no history
of substance abuse/dependence in the past 6 months; and (3) no history of bipolar
disorder and/or psychotic episodes. Diagnostic criteria were determined based on the
Structured Clinical Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (SCID/DSM-IV) (APA, 1994). Inclusion criteria for controls included
absence of current or past psychiatric illness, as assessed by the SCID, and absence of
any psychotropic medications.
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Groups did not differ with respect to gender, education, ethnicity, age, or IQ
(Table 5). Participants in the MDD sample were moderately to severely depressed, with
an average mean score of 30.03 (SD = 10.46) on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDIII; (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)). The mean BDI-II score for control participants was
2.9 (SD = 4.32). Within the MDD group, 41% were currently on medication and 52%
were currently in treatment for depression.
Procedure
All participants provided written consent after receiving a study description. The
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania.
The clinical interview and study procedures were conducted by a master’s-level trained
clinical psychologist (DM). For their participation, participants received $30 for the two
hour study and possible additional payment based on their responses to one of the eight
tasks. The additional payment was to ensure that the tasks had real consequences for the
participants. The task chosen for additional payment was randomly selected, and
participants were informed of the payment procedures prior to performance of each task.
The sequence of administration was: (1) the structured clinical interview, (2) the eight
decision-making tasks, with the order counterbalanced across participants according to a
Latin-square design, (3) the similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler
Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI; Wechsler, 1999); (4) five self-report
questionnaires; and (5) the additional payment prediction questions.
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After completion of all the tasks, the participant rolled an eight-sided die to select
one of the eight tasks for additional payment. For the delay discounting, risk tolerance
and ambiguity tolerance tasks, one trial was selected for payment by rolling a 100-sided
die, and participants were paid according to their choice on that trial. In the delay
discounting task, participants were given an amazon gift card on the same day of
participation but activation of the gift card depended on chosen delay (in days) for the
chosen amount. For all other tasks, payment was made in cash. If participants selected the
gamble in the risk tolerance task, a coin was tossed to determine whether they won or
lost. For the ambiguity tolerance task, participants drew a slip of paper from the envelope
they selected and were paid if they drew the winning color. Participants knew that one
envelope contained 50 red and 50 blue slips of paper, while the other contained at least
25 red and at least 25 blue slips (unknown to the participant there were 49 red slips and
51 blue slips of paper). For the reward learning, punishment learning, and persistence
tasks, participants were paid the total amount they won. For the ultimatum game, the
participants played with actual anonymous players whose responses had already been
collected. For the proposer role, the participant chose one of several responder envelopes
presented to him/her. The envelopes contained the responses of an anonymous person to
the responder role of the ultimatum game. If the anonymous responder accepted the
proposal offered by the participant, the money was divided according to the participant’s
proposal. A corresponding compensation method was employed for the responder role
task.
Measures
39

Clinical Measures. Inclusion and exclusion diagnostic criteria were based on the
SCID. Depression severity was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI- II;
Beck et al., 1996). Current medication and psychotherapy treatment assessment was
based on self-report.
Self-Report Measures. Several self-report measures were used to assess constructs
of depression. The self-report measures used were the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(RSES; (Rosenberg, 1965), the Cognitive Behavioral Avoidance Scale (CBAS;
Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004), the Behavioral Inhibition and Behavioral Activation Scale
(BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994), and the Snaith Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS;
Snaith et al., 1995). Additional measures of anxiety and depression included the Beck
Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990) and the Depression, Anxiety and Stress
Scale (Dass; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1992).
Cognitive Measures. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - Second
Edition (WASI–II; Wechsler, 1999) was used as a brief, reliable measure of cognitive
ability. For the purpose of efficiency, two subtests (matrix reasoning and similarities) of
the WASI were implemented on each participant to obtain a full scale IQ score.
Value-Based Decision-Making Tasks
For the computerized ambiguity, risk tolerance and delay discounting tasks, the
participant had two practice trial runs prior to the task. On making a choice for a trial, the
task automatically moved on to the next trial. Should the participant not make a choice
within 10 seconds, it automatically moved on to the next trial. Each trial was followed by
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a 2-sec inter-trial interval (ITI). For the present report we focus on metrics that make the
least assumptions, but we also calculated more theoretically driven measures for risk
aversion (power utility function exponent), ambiguity tolerance (also a power function
taking the effect of ambiguity of the perceived probability into account) and delay
discounting (discount rates) and obtained similar results. Description of each task
follows:
Risk Tolerance Task. The task is used to measure a participant’s degree of risk
tolerance. The task consisted of 51 choices. In each trial, participants were presented with
the option of choosing either a smaller guaranteed amount of money or a 50% chance of
winning a larger amount of money. For example, “would you choose a 50% chance of
winning $35 or a sure amount of $5?” The expected value of the risky option (probability
of winning times amount) could either be higher or lower than the safe amount.
Performance was measured in percentage of safe options chosen.
Ambiguity Tolerance Task. The task is used to measure a participant’s degree of
ambiguity tolerance. The task consists of 66 choices. In each trial, participants are asked
to choose between a gamble where the chances of winning are known to be 50% (risky)
versus a gamble where the chances of winning are not known exactly (ambiguous). The
amount won for the risky gamble is always equal to or lesser than the ambiguous gamble.
Performance was measured in percentage of risky gambles chosen.
Delay Discounting Task. The task is used to measure the extent to which a
participant discounts delayed rewards. The task consisted of 51 choices. Each choice was
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between a smaller monetary reward available immediately and a larger monetary reward
received after a delay period (in days). For example, “Would you prefer $10 now or $15
in 7 days?” Performance was calculated in percentage of now options chosen.
Persistence or Willingness to Wait (WTW) Task. In the persistence task, decision
makers face the problem of optimizing persistence (in the form of waiting for a higher
monetary reward) appropriately to their environment. The task is divided into two
blocks, A and B. In block A, persistence leads to a higher reward, whereas in block B,
continued persistence if the reward has not arrived by a certain point is suboptimal (see
(McGuire, & Kable, 2012 for details). A yellow light would stay lit for a specific duration
(depending on whether Block A or B condition) before delivering a 30¢ reward.
Participants could choose to wait by leaving the mouse cursor in a box marked, “Wait for
30¢.”Alternatively, by shifting to a box marked “Take 2¢,” participants could receive 2¢
and proceed to a new trial. Each outcome (30¢ or 2¢) was followed by a 2-sec inter-trial
interval (ITI). The cursor could remain in either box across multiple trials. The task was
divided into two blocks (A and B), each lasting seven minutes (total duration 14 min),
and the screen continuously displayed the time remaining and total earned. The optimal
strategy for block A was to wait for the 30¢, while the optimal strategy for block B was
to wait for the 30¢ reward for 5 secs and then take the 2¢ if the large reward had not
arrived.
Individual trials provide different amounts of information about participants’
willingness to wait. Quit trials are the most informative, providing a direct estimate of the
limit on a participant’s willingness to persist. When the reward is delivered, however, we
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observe only that the person was willing to wait at least the duration of the trial. We
accommodate this situation using statistical methods from survival analysis. Analyses
assessed how long a trial would “survive” without the participant quitting.
We constructed a Kaplan-Meier empirical survival curve from each participant’s
responses. For each time t, the curve plots the probability of the participant waiting at
least until t, provided that the reward was not delivered earlier. Analyses were restricted
to the 0–11 sec interval common to the two conditions. The area under the survival curve
(AUC) is a useful summary statistic, representing the average number of seconds an
individual was willing to wait within the analyzed interval. Someone who never quit
earlier than 11 sec would have an AUC of 11. One who was willing to wait up to 3 sec on
half the trials and up to 9 sec on the other half would have an AUC of 6.
Reward Learning Task. In this task, participants choose between two distinct
fractal stimuli, which are positioned randomly at two static locations (left and right of the
central white dot) on screen. On each trial, participants respond by pressing a button on a
keyboard to choose between the two fractals. The fractals are probabilistically rewarded;
with the “richer” fractal rewarded 70% of the time and the “poorer” fractal rewarded 30%
of the time. Positive feedback was provided if a fractal is rewarded (picture of a coin);
otherwise, neutral feedback was provided (a red dot; indicating no coin). Participants
were not informed of the specific underlying reward structure of the task. However, they
were informed that on any given trial, one fractal had a higher likelihood of delivering a
reward and this association reverses periodically throughout the task. All participants
completed 4 trials as practice before proceeding to do a full run of 90 trials. Switches take
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place after 30 trials; hence, there are two switches in total. Each reward has a monetary
value of 25¢. At the end of the task, the screen displayed the total number of quarters the
participant won. In this task the proportion of choosing the richer fractal image (i.e., had
the higher probability of positive feedback) was calculated for each participant.
Punishment Learning Task. This task is similar to the reward learning task, except
the goal for the participant is to avoid choosing the fractal leading to punishment
feedback (red cross overlaying a coin). Participants are informed that at any given point,
one fractal image leads to more losses than the other and that this will switch
periodically. The participant starts the task with $22.50 and each time the participant
chooses the fractal image followed by punishment feedback, 25¢ is deducted from the
total amount. Like the reward task, participants do a 4 trial practice, before proceeding to
do a full run of 90 trials, with two reversals. On completion of the task, the screen
displays the total number of quarters the participant lost. Here the proportion of choosing
the richer fractal image (i.e., had the higher probability of no-punishment feedback) was
calculated for each participant.
Ultimatum Game, Proposer. Participants read the instructions and completed a
practice quiz to ensure they understood the rules of the game. They were instructed that
the game involved two people, the participant was the proposer and an anonymous person
was the responder. They were informed the anonymous responder was a real person
whose responses had already been recorded. As the proposer, the participant had $10 and
could divide this money any way s/he wished to between himself/herself and the
anonymous responder. The anonymous responder had the right to either accept or reject
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the proposal. Should the proposal be accepted, the money would be divided the way the
proposer decided to divide the money. However, if the proposal was rejected, neither the
proposer nor the responder received any money.
Ultimatum Game, Responder. In this task, the participant played the responder’s
role in the ultimatum game. The participant decided whether s/he would accept or reject
each possible proposal an anonymous proposer could make. Should the participant accept
the proposer’s division, the money would be divided accordingly.
Winning Probability or Prediction Question. Each participant responded to this
questionnaire at the end of the study, prior to knowing whether or not they received
additional payment. The questionnaire states, “You have now completed all the required
tasks. One item will be randomly picked from one of the tasks you have performed. You
may or may not receive additional money based on your response. What do you think are
the chances that you will win additional money (in addition to the $30 for participation)
on a scale of 0 – 100%? If you think you have an above 0% chance of winning, then how
much do you think you will win in the range of $0-$100?”
Statistical Analysis
Power analysis using G*Power 3.1.2 indicated that a total of 84 participants are
necessary to detect a conservatively estimated correlation= 0.30 with α = 0.05 and β =
0.80 between the behavioral decision-making task and self-report measure for a specific
component of depression (Faul et al., 2009). Power analysis using G*Power 3.1.2
determined a total of 76 participants are required to detect a moderately estimated
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correlation = 0.40 with α = 0.05 and β = 0.80, for behavioral tasks to predict overall
depression using the BDI (number of regressors = 5). The current study included a total
sample size of 128 individuals (64 clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls)
exceeding the required 84 participants based on the power analysis.
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 21.0 and MATLAB 8.2. All tests
were two-sided. We first compared groups on demographic and clinical characteristics
using independent t-tests, one-way ANOVA and chi-square tests (Table 5). Independent
t-tests were conducted to test significance for performance differences on each task
between the two groups.
Factor Analysis.
To determine underlying latent factors captured by behavioral performance and
self-reports, two separate factor analyses were conducted on the decision task
performance and the self-report data using principal axis factoring using promax
rotations. We also conducted a parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) to determine the number of
factors to extract. Parallel analysis involves comparing the eigenvalues from the sample
being analyzed to those of a randomly generated sample with the same characteristics as
the sample of interest (i.e., same number of observations and variables). Factors for
which the eigenvalues from the sample of interest exceed the corresponding eigenvalues
from the random sample should be retained (Horn, 1965).
Decision Making Factor Analysis. The data was screened for univariate outliers.
The minimum amount of data for factor analysis was satisfied, with a final sample size of
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116 (using listwise deletion), providing a ratio of over 11 cases per variable. The KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .54, just above the recommended value
of .5 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (45) = 149.94, p < .001). The
diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all over .5 and the communalities
were all above .3.
Self-report Factor Analysis. The data was screened for univariate outliers. The
minimum amount of data for factor analysis was satisfied, with a final sample size of 125
(using listwise deletion), providing a ratio of over 12.5 cases per variable. The KaiserMeyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .88, above the recommended value of .5
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 (45) = 912.15, p < .001). The diagonals
of the anti-image correlation matrix were over .5 and the communalities were all above
.3.
Logistic Regression and Out of Sample Prediction.
To determine the predictive power of decision tasks relative to self-reports,
logistic regression was conducted with raw scores and factor scores (from the factor
analysis) for both the decision tasks and self-report measures. To quantify the accuracy of
the raw score logistic models, out of sample predictions were assessed for both decision
tasks and self-report. Each logistic model was tested through multiple iterations on outof-sample individuals to estimate average correct predictive percentage. The logistic
model parameters are calculated based on N number of randomly selected participants
from the study (training set data). The multinomial logistic regression function in
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MATLAB is used to calculate the model parameters. The parameters are then tested on
the remaining participants, called test data (M – N), where M is the size of the entire data
set. For the same N, the training data set is varied so that every participant is part of the
test data set exactly once. We used M = 116 and N = 16. The process is repeated for 20
runs for the same value of N but for different combinations of training data set and test
data set. The percentage of correctly classified participants in the test data set are
calculated and averaged over the 20 runs.
Results
Demographic Characteristics
The groups were similar in their demographic characteristics (Table 5). The
depressed group did not differ from the healthy control group with respect to age, gender,
ethnicity or education (p values > .31). The two groups did not differ in cognitive ability
(p =.35, t = .94). As expected, the MDD group reported significantly higher BDI-II scores
than the healthy control group (p < .001, t = 19.33, d = 3.42).
Value Based Decision Making Performance
As compared to the healthy control group, the MDD group demonstrated
significantly different decision-making on several value-based decision tasks (Table 6).
In the punishment (t = 3.25, p = .001, d = .58) and reward (t = 1.98, p = .05, d = .37)
learning reversal tasks, the depressed group made significantly fewer rich choices than
the controls. In the ultimatum game, the depressed group offered significantly less money
than the controls in the role of proposer (t = 2.10, p = .03, d = .38) and accepted
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significantly less money in the role of responder ( t = 2.17, p = .04, d = .52). In the
prediction questionnaire, depressed participants reported a significantly lower expectation
of winning additional money than healthy controls (t = 2.50, p = .01, d = .44), although
the two groups did not differ in the amount of money they expected to win (average
expectation = $35.50, SD = 22.52). In the ambiguity tolerance task, the MDD group
made significantly less risky choices i.e., more ambiguous choices than healthy controls
(t = 2.03, p = .05, d = .36). In the WTW task, MDD participants showed a reduced
willingness to wait in block A, where the optimal strategy is to persist until the reward
arrives (t = 2.22, p = .03, d = .39). The two groups did not differ in the number of safe
options chosen in the risk tolerance task, the number of now options chosen in the delay
discounting task, or in their willingness to wait in block B of the WTW task (p values >
.36).
Factor Analysis
Two factor analyses were conducted on the data from the behavioral decisionmaking tasks and the self-report measures to determine underlying latent factors.
Decision-Making Tasks. An exploratory factor analysis using principal axis
factoring with promax rotations was conducted, with four factors explaining 40.16% of
the variance (Table 7). The parallel analysis indicated a three-factor solution best
described the structure of the decision variables (Table 8). The scree plot indicates the
presence of at least four factors (Figure 6). Since the factor analysis and the scree plot
support the four-factor solution and the purpose of the current study is to determine
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potential underlying dimensions (as opposed to item reduction), the four-factor solution
was retained to best explain the structure. The first factor consisted of the reward and
punishment reversal learning tasks and the delayed discounting task. The second factor
included block A and block B of the persistence task. The third factor consisted of the
ambiguity and risk tolerance tasks. The fourth factor consisted of the winning probability
prediction question, and the proposer and responder roles of the ultimatum game.
To determine which of these factors, if any, were associated with depression, we
ran a logistic regression model. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed
individuals from controls (χ2 = 18.89, p < .001 with df = 4). However, the Wald criterion
demonstrated that only the first factor was a significant predictor (p = .001), though the
third and fourth factors approached significance (Table 9).
Self-Report Measures. An exploratory factor analysis using principal axis
factoring with promax rotations was conducted, with two factors explaining 63.62% of
the variance (Table 10). Both parallel analysis (Table 11) and the scree plot (Figure 7)
supported the two-factor structure. The first factor comprised of all the negative affect
related questionnaires including the self-esteem, behavioral inhibition, Snaith Hamilton
and cognitive-avoidance subcomponents. The underlying factor seemed to explain overall
depression. The second factor consisted of positive components including the three
activation BAS components in the BIS/BAS measure.
To determine which of these factors, if any, were associated with depression, we
ran a logistic regression model. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed
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individuals from controls (χ2 = 115.08, p < .0001 with df = 2). The Wald criterion
demonstrated that only the first factor (negative affect) was a significant predictor (p <
.0001) (Table 12).
Logistic Regression
We conducted logistic regressions using decision performance and self-reports to
determine out of sample prediction accuracy, and to isolate specific tasks or self-reports
that explain unique variance in depression.
A logistic regression analysis was conducted using all of the decision tasks as
predictors, and was statistically significant (χ2 = 26.81, p < .003 with df = 10).
Nagelkerke’s R2 of .26 indicated a small relationship between prediction and grouping.
The Wald criterion demonstrated that proportion of rich choices in the punishment
learning task made a significant contribution to prediction (p = .02), while the minimum
acceptance amount in the ultimatum game (p = .053) and winning probability (p = .076)
trended towards significance (Table 13).
Using a step-down procedure, we created a reduced model with only significant
predictors (Table 14). The reduced model contained only three predictors (punishment
learning, responder in the ultimatum game, winning probability judgment). The
predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed individuals from controls (χ2 = 20.97,
p < .001 with df = 3). We used this model to determine out-of-sample prediction accuracy
for the decision tasks. Prediction accuracy was 62%, which is significantly beyond
chance levels (Z = 2.37, p = .02, 95% CI .52 - .70).
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A logistic regression analysis was conducted using the self-report measures as
predictors. The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed individuals from
controls (χ2 = 131.04, p < .0001 with df = 10). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .86 indicated a strong
relationship between prediction and grouping. The Wald criterion demonstrated the
Rosenberg Self Esteem (p = .08), the Snaith Hamilton (p = .08) and the BIS (p = .09)
trended towards significance (Table 15).
Using a step-down procedure, we created a reduced model with only significant
predictors (Table 16). The reduced model contained only three predictors (SnaithHamilton, self-esteem and BIS). The predictors as a set reliably distinguished depressed
individuals from controls (χ2 = 122.65, p < .000 with df = 3). Nagelkerke’s R2 of .83
indicated a strong relationship between prediction and grouping. We used this model to
determine out-of-sample prediction accuracy for self-reports. Prediction accuracy was
92%, which is significantly beyond chance levels (Z = 9.34, p < .0001, 95% CI .86 - .95).
Discussion
The first question this study addressed was how depressed individuals differ from
healthy controls in value-based decision-making. Depressed individuals were less
successful at learning from punishments and from rewards, offered more money as a
proposer and accepted less money as a responder in the ultimatum game, believed they
had a lower probability of receiving money from the experiment, had greater ambiguity
tolerance, and were less persistent in waiting for delayed rewards (when persistence was
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the best strategy). Depressed individuals did not differ from healthy controls in their
degree of delay discounting or risk tolerance.
A factor analysis of performance across all of these tasks identified four
dimensions. The first factor called myopic decision making was comprised of the
learning tasks and delay discounting. These tasks may jointly identify a tendency to make
decisions based on the immediate context, rather than taking prior experience or future
outcomes into consideration. The second and third factors were straightforward, and were
comprised of the persistence tasks and tasks measuring tolerance of uncertainty
respectively. The fourth factor, bias, was comprised of the prediction question and the
ultimatum game. The prediction question and the proposer role of the ultimatum game
may jointly identify a tendency towards pessimistic beliefs (e.g., “I won’t win,” “That
offer wouldn’t be accepted.”)
The second question this study addressed was what the biggest differences in
value-based decision-making are between depressed and non-depressed individuals. The
three tasks that showed the most reliable differences were punishment learning,
predicting the likelihood of a positive event, and behavior as a responder in the ultimatum
game. These three tasks were also the most significant predictors of depression. The
three tasks accounted for distinct variance in predicting depression and loaded onto two
separate dimensions in the decision performance factor analysis.
The third question this study addressed was how accurately depressed individuals
could be categorized on the basis of decision performance alone. A logistic regression
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model with the three most predictive tasks as regressors had an out-of-sample correct
prediction accuracy of 62%. Although not dramatic, this degree of accuracy was
significantly beyond chance. A logistic regression model using the self-report measures,
on the other hand, showed an extremely high predictive accuracy of 92%. These results
clearly demonstrate that value-based decision tasks are still a long way from the
predictive accuracy of self-reports. However, we hasten to add two caveats. First,
depression is determined by structured clinical interviews in which patients provide
subjective reports of their symptoms. Thus it is not surprising that the written self-reports
have such a high predictive accuracy, given the similarity of the constructs of the shared
variance in method. Second, the goal of examining the predictive accuracy of decision
performance is not to develop a diagnostic test for depression according to current
diagnostic criteria, but rather to identify theoretically driven behavioral measures that
may capture some of the heterogeneous differences between depressed and healthy
individuals. Considering these two caveats, the significant predictive accuracy of valuebased decision-making tasks we observed shows promise for future research in this area.
Interestingly, the three tasks that our results highlight as being most sensitive to
depression – punishment learning tasks, probability judgment and the ultimatum game –
have all been associated with depression previously. Punishment learning was the most
predictive task. There is now a large body of research showing that reinforcement
learning is impaired in mood disorders (Dombrovski et al., 2010; McGirr, Dombrovski,
Butters, Clark, & Szanto, 2012; D. Pizzagalli et al., 2009; D. A. Pizzagalli, Iosifescu,
Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008). For example, in one study participants make a difficult
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perceptual categorization over the course of several trials, and the probability of reward
delivery is three times higher following one response versus the other. In healthy
volunteers, this manipulation reliably induces a bias toward the “rich” (more frequently
rewarded) response and away from the “poor” response (D. A. Pizzagalli et al., 2008).
Adults with MDD develop weaker response biases. Similar results have been obtained
with other reinforcement learning paradigms. Our findings suggest that reinforcement
learning is the domain in which depressed individuals differ the most from controls.
Given the well-established role of the dopamine system in reinforcement learning, this
reinforces the critical role that changes in dopaminergic neural circuits, including targets
in the ventromedial frontal lobe and ventral striatum, may play in depression (Mayberg,
1994; Tye et al., 2012).
The depressed group also differed reliably from healthy controls on the prediction
questionnaire, estimating a significantly lower likelihood of winning additional payment.
As the depressed group predicted a 50% probability, when the true probability was much
higher, they exhibited a clear pessimistic bias. This is in alignment with previous research
indicating that depressed individuals were more pessimistic in their predictions of the
likelihood of future outcomes than non-depressed individuals, given identical information
with which to make their forecasts (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987). The literature on optimism
bias and depressive realism supports a difference between depressed individuals and
controls that goes in the same direction. That this difference was apparent using only one
question in the current study suggests it is reliable. Furthermore, brain activity in the
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rostral anterior cingulate cortex is associated with the trait optimism while irregularities
in this area are related to depression (Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007).
Depressed individuals were also more likely to accept unfair proposals in the
ultimatum game. A previous study also found that depressed individuals were more likely
to accept unfair proposals (Harlé, Allen, & Sanfey, 2010). Another study did not see this
effect, but did find that MDD patients offered significantly more as proposers (Destoop,
Schrijvers, De Grave, Sabbe, & De Bruijn, 2012), as we find here. Depression is
accompanied by clear deficits in social interaction, and a social decision making task like
the ultimatum game may prove a useful tool in dissecting these deficits.
Depressed individuals were significantly different from controls in two other
decision tasks, although the effects in these cases were smaller. Contrary to the avoidance
behavior demonstrated by depressed individuals in daily life activities, they were more
tolerant of ambiguity than controls. One possible explanation is that depressed
individuals saw both gambles in this task as highly uncertain or as having low subjective
probability. That is, depressed individuals may distinguish less between risk and
ambiguity. As this is the first investigation of ambiguity aversion in depression to our
knowledge, further replication is warranted. Future studies should also examine the
generalizability of this finding beyond monetary gambles.
Unlike previous suggestions (Lempert & Pizzagalli, 2010), we did not find
differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals in delay discounting. In the
persistence task, however, depressed individuals were willing to wait significantly less
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time for the delayed reward under conditions where persistence is the optimal strategy
(Block A). No differences were observed when persistence was not the optimal strategy
(Block B). Given the known role of serotonin signaling in persistence, further
investigation of this effect is merited.
The results need to be interpreted in light of a couple of limitations. Though many
patients were referred from depression clinics, we do not have inter-rater reliability for
the depression diagnosis. We did not look at treatment and drug effects. Although we did
not screen out individuals comorbid with bipolar, substance abuse and/or psychotic
symptoms, we did not take other co-morbidity issues into account. Though we matched
the groups on IQ, we did not include IQ in the analyses. Working memory, another
potential confound, was also not taken into account. There may be other, unmeasured,
confounds that differ between the two groups.
Another limitation of the study is both the clinical and control groups were
combined in the sample for the factor analysis, as the sample size would have been too
small for separate analyses. Because of the potential lack of homogeneity in the
combined sample, the interpretation of these results should be treated with caution.
Limitations withstanding, we see two important directions in which this work
could be extended. First, the current study focused on distinguishing depressed from
healthy individuals. An equally important task is to distinguish different mental illnesses
from each other and/or discover their commonalities. We know very little about whether
and in what way decision-making measures may prove useful for this purpose. Second,
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the decision measures that were most predictive in the current study may prove even
more so with further refinement. There are numerous ways depressed individuals may
perform poorly in punishment learning, and the other two measures were essentially
single questions. Beyond refining the behavioral measures, these three tasks are also
associated with distinct neural activity, and therefore may point towards brain measures
that may prove even more sensitive and specific. Overall further investigation of decision
making in clinically depressed individuals is warranted to better understanding the nature
of clinical depression.
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CHAPTER 3: REWARD? WHAT REWARD? PROBABILISTIC REVERSAL
LEARNING IN MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER

Abstract
Evidence suggests that depression is associated with impaired reward and
punishment processing but very little research has investigated the specific performance
deficits driving poor outcomes. We analyzed reinforcement-based decision-making
behavior of individuals diagnosed with depression at three levels: overt performance in
terms of proportion of richer choices, specific types of choices driving performance and,
finally, quantitatively modeling choice behavior based on computational reinforcement
learning (RL) models.
Methods: Sixty-four clinically depressed and 64 healthy controls participated in a
reward and punishment-based RL probabilistic task. Participants were compensated for
their participation.
Results: Depressed individuals made significantly poorer choices on both the
reward (d = .37) and the punishment (d = .58) reversal learning task. Depressed
participants made significantly less win-stay choices, i.e., making the same choice, given
the choice led to a reward or no punishment in the previous trial (d = 5.1 and 3.92 for
punishment and reward task respectively). Choice behavior in depressed individuals was
best fit by model free RL while model based learning best described choice behavior of
healthy controls. Additionally, depressed individuals robustly showed a lower stimuluslearning rate controlling for action learning rate, perseveration, and choice bias.
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Conclusion: The results suggest that depression is characterized by
hyposensitivity to reward. The RL models suggest impaired performance was due to both
cognitive deficits as well as reduced reward responsiveness in depressed individuals. The
results are promising for the emerging field of computational psychiatry.
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Reward? What Reward? Probabilistic Reversal Learning in Major Depressive Disorder

Depression is associated with varied symptoms ranging from mood changes to
cognitive impairment (Smith, Morris, Friston, Cowen, & Dolan, 1999). Some of these
symptoms may be driven at least in part by abnormal responses to affective stimuli, such
as rewards and punishments (Eshel & Roiser, 2010). In the previous chapter (Mukherjee,
unpublished) we saw that depressed individuals perform significantly differently from
healthy controls on several decision-making tasks, but the most robust differences were
in learning from rewards and punishments. Prior research corroborates our findings and
shows that depressed individuals exhibit deficits in reward learning/reward bias tasks.
Further, these deficits have been associated with symptoms of depression such as
deriving low positive affect from pleasant events and high negative affect from
unpleasant events (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998).
Although there is strong evidence that depressed individuals are impaired at
reward and punishment learning, the underlying causes behind this impairment are less
clear. A goal of the present study is to examine the reasons for impaired performance in
probabilistic reversal learning for rewards and punishments. There are many possible
causes for impairment on these tasks. Depressed individuals may exhibit a suboptimal
learning rate, reacting too slowly or too quickly to rewards and punishments. In contrast
to a general hypo- or hyper-responsiveness to rewards and punishments, depressed
individuals may be able to learn the initial contingencies well, but then be unable to
adjust when these contingences reverse. Alternatively, depressed individuals may be less
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able to take advantage of the structure of the task – that when one stimulus has a high
probability of reward, the other has a low probability. This would suggest a cognitive
deficit. There are several other possible explanations for poor performance that have little
to do with learning reward or punishment contingencies per se. One possibility may be
that depressed individuals perseverate more, i.e., once they pick an option they repeat that
choice irrespective of feedback. Depressed individuals might also exhibit bias towards a
particular stimulus irrespective of feedback. Finally, another possibility is that depressed
individuals have stronger action-outcome associations, which are unhelpful and impede
learning stimulus-outcome associations.
Previous studies have linked depression with hyposensitivity to reward as well as
hypersensitivity to punishment. The results from the previous chapter (Mukherjee,
unpublished) show that impaired learning is significant in both the punishment and the
reward-based task, with a stronger effect for the punishment task. However, in a study a
probabilistic selection task used to examine hypersensitivity to punishment in Major
Depressive Disorder (MDD) patients found no significant differences between MDD
patients and healthy controls (Chase et al., 2010). Other studies have found a
hyposensitivity to rewards. In a probabilistic reward task, participants were asked to
identify whether the mouth length of a cartoon face was short or long, with participants
receiving asymmetrical rewards depending on whether correct responses were provided
(Pizzagalli, Jahn, & O’Shea, 2005). Non-depressed participants learned a response bias in
which the highly reinforced choice was preferred, while nonclinical depressed
participants and MDD patients showed low levels of response bias (Pizzagalli et al.,
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2005; Pizzagalli, Iosifescu, Hallett, Ratner, & Fava, 2008). The present study has two
goals. First, does hypersensitivity to punishment, hyposensitivity to reward, or both,
explain deficits in probabilistic reversal learning? The second goal is to determine
whether learning is impaired for reward or punishment, or both, and to determine whether
type of learning engaged by depressed individuals differs depending on reward or
punishment feedback.
To achieve these goals, the present study will investigate detailed aspects of
reversal learning performance in both depressed and healthy control individuals and fit
computational models to assess what aspects of performance differ in the two groups.
Computational modeling is a more sophisticated method of understanding learning,
which has been used to study healthy individuals and individuals with organic disorders
such as Parkinson’s (Rutledge et al., 2009; Frank, Seeberger, & O'reilly, 2004; Daw,
O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Frank, Moustafa, Haughey, Curran, &
Hutchison, 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2004), but has not yet been used to study learning
behavior in depressed individuals.
Methods
Participants
Between October 2012 and January 2014, 128 participants (64 diagnosed with
current MDD and 64 healthy controls) were recruited for the study. MDD participants
were recruited through flyers and information provided by research assistants for patients
enrolling in treatment studies in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Health, and
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flyers posted in the Counseling and Psychological Services at the University of
Pennsylvania and the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (HUP). A small subset
of these individuals (12) agreed to be taped during the diagnostic interview for reliability
purposes. Diagnostic reliability was not ascertained for the purposes of the present study
as more than 80% of the individuals who participated were being referred after being
given a primary diagnosis of MDD for another clinical study at Penn. Healthy control
participants were recruited from the staff and advanced students through flyers posted in
the Department of Psychology, Law, and Psychiatry, the Graduate Student Office, and
the HUP. Participants likely to meet study criteria based on an initial phone screen were
invited for a diagnostic interview. MDD participants were enrolled if they met the
following criteria (1) diagnostic criteria for current MDD, (2) no history of substance
abuse/dependence in the past 6 months, (3) no history of bipolar disorder and/or
psychotic episodes. Diagnostic criteria were determined based on the Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (SCID/DSM-IV) (APA, 1994). Inclusion criteria for controls included absence of
current or past psychiatric illness, as assessed by the SCID, and the absence of any
psychotropic medications.
All participants provided written consent after receiving a study description. The
study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Pennsylvania.
The clinical interview and study procedures were conducted by a master’s level trained
clinical psychologist (DM). The data we report here from the reward and punishment
reversal-learning tasks were collected as part of a larger research study investigating
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value-based decision-making in individuals diagnosed with MDD. Participants were paid
$15/hr. They received additional incentive based on their choices in one randomly
selected decision task out of the eight administered. The sequence of administration of
the various components of the study took place in the following order – administration of
the structured clinical interview, performance on the eight decision-making tasks
(including the reward and punishment probabilistic reversal learning tasks), performance
on the similarities and matrix reasoning subtests of the Wechsler Abbreviated
Intelligence Scale (WASI; Wechsler, 1999), and completion of self-report measures.
Measures
Clinical Measures. Inclusion and exclusion diagnostic criteria were based on the
SCID. Depression severity was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck
et al., 1996). Current medication and psychotherapy treatment assessment was based on
self-report.
Cognitive Measure. The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence - Second
Edition (WASI–II) provides a brief, reliable measure of cognitive ability. For the purpose
of efficiency, two subtests (matrix reasoning and similarities) of the WASI were
administered to each subject to obtain a full scale IQ score.
Reward Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task. In this task, subjects choose
between two distinct fractal stimuli (Figure 8), which are positioned randomly at one of
two locations (left and right of the central white dot) on screen. On each trial, participants
respond by pressing a button on a keyboard to choose between the two fractals. Positive
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feedback is provided if a fractal is reinforced with a reward (picture of a quarter);
otherwise, neutral feedback is provided (a red dot). The fractals are probabilistically
rewarded; with the richer fractal rewarded 70% of the time and the poorer fractal
rewarded 30% of the time. Participants are not informed of the specific underlying
reward structure of the task. However, they are informed that on any given trial, one
fractal has a higher likelihood of delivering a reward and that this association reverses
periodically throughout the task. All participants complete 4 trials as practice before
proceeding to do a full run of 90 trials. The 90 trials are divided into three blocks of 30
trials each. At the end of 30 trials a reversal takes place, i.e. the image which had the
higher reward probability now has the lower reward probability and vice versa. Each
reward has a monetary value of $0.25. At the end of the task, the screen displays the total
number of quarters the participant won.
Punishment Probabilistic Reversal Learning Task. This task is similar to the
reward probabilistic reversal learning task except the goal for the participant is to try to
avoid choosing the fractal leading to punishment (signified by red cross overlaying a
quarter) (Figure 8). Participants are informed that at any given point, one fractal image
leads to more losses than the other and that this will switch periodically. The participant
starts the task with $22.50 and each time the participant chooses the fractal image
followed by punishment feedback, $0.25 is deducted from the initial total amount
($22.50). Like the reward task, subjects do a 4 trial practice, before proceeding to do a
full run of 90 trials, with two reversals. On completion of the task, the screen displays the
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total number of quarters the participant lost, and wins $22.50 minus the total number of
lost quarters.
Performance Analysis
Aspects of performance measured in both groups were, (1) average proportion of
rich choices made, (2) proportion of win-stay choices and lose-shift choices, and (3)
proportion of win-stay and lose-shift choices broken down by whether the fractals were
presented on the same side or different sides in consecutive trials. Rich choices were
choices of the fractal with the higher probability of reward (for the reward-learning task)
or the higher probability of no punishment (for the punishment-learning task). A win-stay
choice is when a participant repeats the same choice (chose the same fractal image) when
making that choice in the previous trial led to a win (reward or no punishment). A loseshift choice is when the participant switches his/her choice (chose a different fractal
image) when the choice in the previous trial led to no reward (in the reward-learning
task) or to punishment (in the punishment-learning task). Win-stay and lose-shift choices
were also analyzed separately depending on whether the fractals were presented on the
same sides in consecutive trials or whether the fractals switched sides.
Linear Regression Model
In order to test whether the choice behavior of participants was consistent with
reinforcement learning, we first fit a linear regression to choice data (Lau & Glimcher,
2008). We assumed that influences of past rewards were linearly combined to determine
choice on each trial, with choice probability computed using the softmax rule. We used
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logistic regression to estimate weights for rewards received and choices made on
previous trials. The goal of the regression was to estimate the probabilities of choosing
the fractal 1 image, PF1(t), and the fractal 2 image, PF2(t), respectively. Since there are
only two options, we assume symmetric weights for the two options, and the model for
10 previous rewards and one previous choice reduces to the following:

 P (t )  10
log  F 1    ai ( RF 1 (t  i)  RF 2 (t  i))  b(CF 1 (t  1)  CF 2 (t  1))  c
 PF 2 (t )  i 1

(1)

Here, the coefficients ai and b represent changes in the log odds of choosing fractal 1 and
fractal 2 options with ai the weight for a reward received i trials ago, b is the weight for
the last choice made. Positive weights indicate increases in the log odds of choice as a
function of previous rewards (ai) or last choice. The log odds of the subject making a
given choice on a specific trial is obtained by linearly combining outcomes (rewards),
weighted by the coefficient extracted by the regression and a bias factor c. Behavior
consistent with RL should demonstrate an exponential decline of the influence of past
rewards. The linear regression model thus relaxes the constraint imposed by the
reinforcement learning models that weights must decline exponentially, which enables us
to examine the robustness of this assumption.
Reinforcement Learning Models
Finally, we fit different computational models to examine how these could
account for aspects of performance that differed between the two groups. Computational
models were fit with the function minimization tools in MATLAB.
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Model Free RL
We first fit choice data from all subject groups with a standard reinforcement
learning model (Sutton & Barto, 1998). The model uses the sequence of choices and
outcomes to estimate the expected value of each option for every trial. The expected
values are set to zero at the beginning of the experiment, and after each trial, the value of
the chosen option (for example, VF 1 (t ) for fractal 1 option at trial t) was updated
according to the following rule:

VF1 (t  1)  VF1 (t )  αs δs (t )

(2)

δs (t )  RF1 (t )  VF1 (t )

(3)

Here, δs (t ) is the stimulus reward prediction error (RPE), the difference between the
experienced and the expected reward. RF 1 (t ) represents the outcome received from the
fractal 1 option on trial t with a value of 1 for a reward and 0 otherwise. The learning rate

αs determines how rapidly the estimate of expected value for the fractal image chosen is
updated. If the learning rate is high, recent outcomes have a relatively greater influence
on the expected value than less recent outcomes.
This model also included other parameters that are not helpful for learning but
that our analysis of the performance metrics indicated could potentially be influencing
choice behavior. These added parameters included a term for choice perseveration, a term
of bias towards one stimulus, and two terms (learning rate and noise) for action learning.
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Action learning is similar to the above model except that here the model uses the
sequence of actions (left/right button presses rather than fractals chosen) and outcomes to
estimate the expected value of each action for every trial. The expected values are set to
zero at the beginning of the experiment, and after each trial, the value of the chosen
action (for example, VL (t ) for the left hand option at trial t) was updated according to the
following rule:

VL (t  1)  VL (t )  αa δa (t )

(4)

δa (t )  RL (t )  VL (t )

(5)

Here, δa (t ) is the action reward prediction error (RPE), the difference between the
experienced and the expected reward. RL (t ) is the outcome received from using the left
hand on trial t with a value of 1 for a reward and 0 otherwise. The learning rate αa
determines how rapidly the estimate of expected value is updated. If the learning rate is
high, recent outcomes have a relatively greater influence on the expected value of than
less recent outcomes.
Choice is theoretically a function of expected stimulus value. We can combine the
stimulus and action based models into a six parameter model to reflect the influence of
both types of learning parameters in a dual model. Given the expected values for both
fractal options, the probability of choosing fractal 1 option PF 1 (t ) is computed using the
following softmax rule:
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PF 1 (t ) 

1
1  exp{ βs VF 1 (t )  VF 2 (t )   βa VL (t )  VR (t )   ...

(6)

... c  CF 1 (t  1)  CF 2 (t  1)   d  DF 1 (t  1)  DF 2 (t  1) }
Here, βs is the noise parameter for stimulus, βa is the noise parameter for action
learning VF 1 (t ) and VF 2 (t ) are the values of fractal 1 and fractal 2 on trial t
respectively, VL (t ) and VR (t ) is the values for choosing the left and the right hand
respectively at trial t, CF1 (t  1) and CF 2 (t  1) represent the choice of fractal 1 and
fractal 2 on the presvious trial t – 1 respectively, with a value of 1 for the chosen
option and 0 otherwise i.e. CF1 (t )  1  CF 2 (t ) , DF1 (t  1) and DF 2 (t  1) represent
the bias towards fractal 1 and fractal 2 on the previous trial t – 1 respectively,
with a value of 1 for the chosen option and 0 for the option not chosen.
The dual RL model consisted of six parameters - αs (stimulus based learning
rate), αa (action based learning rate), βs and βa (noise parameters), c (choice
perseveration parameter), and d (bias parameter) and were estimated by maximum
likelihood (Burnham & Anderson, 2002).
Model based RL
We also fit a second variation of the model that involved an update of both the chosen
and unchosen options in the stimulus-based learning equation. This model approximates a
model-based Bayesian learner, because it takes into account the structure of the task and
the fact that the reward probabilities on the two options are anti-correlated. Stimulus
values are updated using the following rule:
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RPE

δF1 (t )  RF1 (t )  VF1 (t )

(7)

Chosen Value

VF1 (t  1)  VF1 (t )  αδF1 (t )

(8)

Unchosen Value

VF 2 (t  1)  VF1 (t )  αδF 2 (t )

(9)

The new value at trial t  1 for the currently chosen fractal is based on the sum of the
observed prediction VF 1 and the prediction error RF1 (t )  VF1 (t ) whereas the value for the
unchosen option VF 2 is based on a fictitious prediction error VF1 (t )  αδF 2 (t ) that takes
the counterfactual outcome for the current trial into account. In this model α is the
learning rate, i.e., the influence of both prediction errors on the value update. The
inclusion of an update rule for the unchosen option captures an important feature of the
task structure, namely that the choice values are anti-correlated. This update rule
incorporates the knowledge the participants have that when the action they are choosing
increases or decreases in value, the value of the option they are not choosing does the
opposite.

Model Comparison
To compare the RL models, we penalized model fits for complexity using the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978). We computed BIC using the
following equation:
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BIC  2log L  k log n

(10)

Here, L is the maximum log likelihood for the estimated model given the data, k is the
number of free parameters in the model, and n is the number of trials. Models with lower
BIC are preferred.
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 21.0 and MATLAB 8.2. All tests
were two-sided. We first compared groups on demographic and clinical characteristics
using independent t-tests, one-way ANOVA and chi-square tests (Table 17). Performance
metrics were compared between the two groups or within groups using independent ttests.
Results
Demographic Characteristics
Groups did not differ with respect to gender, education, ethnicity, or age (p values
above .3, Table 17). The groups did not differ in cognitive ability (p = .35). Participants
in the MDD sample were moderately to severely depressed, with a significantly higher
average BDI–II mean score of 30.03 (SD = 10.46) than control subjects was (M = 2.9,
SD = 4.32, p < .001). Within the MDD group, 41% and 52% were on current medication
or in treatment for depression, respectively.
Behavioral Performance Results
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Depressed individuals performed significantly poorer on both reward and
punishment reversal learning. In the reward reversal learning task depressed participants
(M = 59.59%, SD = 9.84) made significantly fewer rich choices than the controls (M =
63.21%, SD = 10.80, p = .05). This was true for the punishment task also. In the
punishment reversal-learning task, the depressed participants (M = 58.49%, SD = 9.93)
made significantly fewer rich choices than the controls (M = 64.56%, SD = 10.81, p =
.001, Figure 9).
These deficits appear during initial learning and continue throughout the task, a
pattern inconsistent with a specific inability to reverse learned contingencies. In the
reward task, we see controls perform better than the depressed group across all three
blocks, with significant differences from trials 30 through 57 and 72 through 77 (p values
< .04, Figure 9). For the punishment-learning task, we see a similar pattern (Figure 9).
The depressed group chose significantly less rich choices from the beginning, with
significant differences from trials 12 through 23, 32 through 57 and finally 74 through 85
(p values < .01).
We next examined whether behavior in the two groups was consistent with
reinforcement learning by measuring a participant’s win-stay and lose-shift choices.
Specifically, behavior consistent with RL would evidence a high proportion of win-stay
choices. In the reward learning task, the average proportion of win-stay choices for both
groups was above 50%, but was significantly less for the depressed group (M = .74, S.E
= .03) than the control group (M = .84, S.E = .02, p = .03) (Figure 10). No significant
differences were observed for lose-stay choices with both groups shifting approximately
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50% of the time after experiencing no reward in the preceding trial. A similar pattern was
observed in the punishment learning task. The average proportion of win-stay choices
was greater than 50% in both groups, but significantly less in the depressed group (M =
.71, S.E = .03) compared to the control group (M = .83, S.E = .02, p < .001) (Figure 10).
Again, there were no significant differences for the lose-shift proportions. The high
proportion of win-stay choices in both groups in both tasks is consistent with
reinforcement learning. However, the controls were more responsive to positive feedback
in both tasks, suggesting the depressed group may be less sensitive to positive outcomes.
Looking at win-stay versus lose-shift choices according to whether the specific
motor response repeated or not (fractals were on the same side vs. different side across
trials) revealed a potential influence of action learning on task performance. In the reward
learning task, a within group comparison demonstrated both depressed and control
individuals were significantly more likely to win-stay and lose-shift when the specific
motor action repeated across trials (p’s <.05). The punishment task results showed a
similar significant pattern (p’s <.05) for win stay and lose shift action association (Figure
10). In short, both groups engaged in action outcome learning.
To more rigorously check whether choice behavior was consistent with
reinforcement learning, we fit trial-by-trial choice data using a linear regression model
(Figure 11). Reinforcement learning models assume the influence of rewards from
previous trials decays in an exponential manner determined by the learning rate (α). The
linear regression fits show behavior was consistent with reinforcement learning in both
tasks in both groups. The first two parameters were above zero for both groups in both
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tasks, and higher weight was assigned to the reward received in the preceding trial
compared to rewards received two trials back (p’s < .0001). The fits also suggest that the
control group learns at a faster rate, as a higher weight was assigned to the most recent
trial in the control group than in the depressed group (reward task, t = 9.31, p < .0001;
punishment task, t = 9.67, p < .0001).
We next analyzed whether computational models could capture these aspects of
performance, including the difference between the two groups. We first compared the
model-free versus model-based reinforcement learning algorithms. Model-free learning
only updates the value of the chosen option, while model based learning implies both
chosen and unchosen values are updated. The model-based algorithm thus takes into
account the structure of the task, that reward probabilities on the two fractals are
anticorrelated. Given the observed effects of repeating the motor action on win-stay and
lose shift choices in both groups, we also included a (model-free) action learning
component in the model, as well as terms for choice persistence and bias towards one of
the fractals.
Two major differences were detected between the groups. First, for both the
reward and punishment learning tasks, model-based reinforcement learning fit the choice
data for the control group better than model-free reinforcement learning, while the
reverse was true in depressed individuals (Table 18). Second, irrespective of model-based
versus model-free, the one component of the model that significantly differed across
groups was the learning rate (Table 19). Models that assumed that depressed and control
subjects had different learning rates consistently fit the choice data better, while this was
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not the case for action learning, persistence, or bias parameters. In the reward task, the
best fit learning rate for controls is .73 while for depressed individuals it was .41; for the
punishment task, the learning rates were .71 and .37 for controls and depressed
respectively. Thus, for both tasks depressed individuals demonstrate a lower learning rate
than controls.
Discussion
In this study we show why depressed individuals learn from rewards and
punishments poorer than controls. Our analyses of performance and computational
modeling of behavior revealed two interesting differences. First, depressed individuals
are more likely to engage in model-free reinforcement learning while controls are more
likely to use the structure of the task and engage in model-based reinforcement learning.
Second, regardless of whether learning is model-free or model-based, depressed
individuals have a lower learning rate than controls. These two differences held
irrespective of whether the task involved reward learning or punishment learning.
Our detailed analyses of performance help answer an important question - are
depressed individuals hyposensitive to reward, hypersensitive to punishment, or both?
Hyposensitivity to reward would fit nicely with one of the primary symptoms of
depression, anhedonia, which is the inability to experience pleasure from experiences
previously enjoyed. Hypersensitivity to punishment could explain the avoidance
behaviors also characteristic of depression. Just looking at overall performance on reward
and punishment learning, one might be tempted to interpret the larger deficit in
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punishment learning as evidence for hypersensitivity to punishment. However, a more
detailed look shows convincingly that depressed individuals are less sensitive to positive
feedback in these probabilistic reversal learning tasks, and that this is true regardless of
whether the task involves learning from rewards or punishments. This shows that a
hyposensitivity to reward (including “no punishment” trials in the punishment task) is
driving the difference in task outcome, not hypersensitivity to punishment. This
information is also important in terms of understanding depression. Depressed
individuals may need more help in recognizing and integrating reward and positive
information as opposed to decreasing the impact of punishment and negative information.
Why were depressed individuals worse in the punishment task? This could
potentially be due to the weak positive feedback signal in the task, which is essentially
“no punishment.” According to this explanation, depressed individuals are hyposensitive
to positive feedback, and perform worse when that positive feedback is the lack of
punishment than when that positive feedback is the receipt of a reward.
The computational modeling fits show that depressed individuals were more
likely to engage in model-free learning strategies, while controls were more likely to
engage in model-based learning strategies. Model-based learning takes into account the
structure of the task (specifically, that reward probabilities on the two fractals are
anticorrelated). Model-based learning may be associated with more controlled and goaldirected behavior while model-free learning may be associated with more habitual and
automatic behavior. Previous studies have shown that model-based learning entails a
higher cognitive load, which can be disrupted under the influence of stress. Studies have
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found that the stress response attenuates the contribution of model-based but not modelfree learning to choice (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013; Otto, Gershman,
Markman, & Daw, 2013). Moreover, stress-induced behavioral changes were modulated
by individual working memory (WM) capacity, such that low-WM-capacity individuals
were more susceptible to detrimental stress effects than high-WM-capacity individuals.
An appealing interpretation of our findings, then, is that the psychological stress of
depression may interfere with goal-directed or model-based learning, leading depressed
individuals to depend on suboptimal model-free learning strategies.
The second difference we observed in our computational model fits was that
depressed individuals exhibited a lower learning rate than controls in both the reward and
punishment learning tasks. This finding is also supported by the lower percentage of winstay choices in the depressed group and the linear regression fits. This effect is consistent
with the literature suggesting reduced reward responsiveness in depressed individuals.
Using probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks, studies have found MDD individuals,
compared to controls, show significantly reduced reward responsiveness (Eshel & Roiser,
2010; Pizzagalli et al., 2005; Pizzagalli et al., 2008). In one study, trial-by-trial
probability analyses revealed that MDD subjects were impaired at integrating
reinforcement history over time and developed a weaker response bias toward the
stimulus with a higher reward probability (Pizzagalli et al., 2008).
Finally, although not measured directly in the current study, the current results
suggest neurobiological implications. Reinforcement learning has been associated with
dopaminergic signals and the prefrontal cortical and striatal targets of those signals.
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Studies support attenuated striatal function in depressive pathology across multiple
cognitive tasks, from higher-order planning to gambling (Eshel & Roiser, 2010; Price &
Drevets, 2009). Interestingly, one study found impaired reward (but not punishment)
reversal behavior in depression alongside attenuated ventral striatal response to
unexpected reward (Robinson, Cools, Carlisi, Sahakian, & Drevets, 2012). Another study
found that reduced ventral striatal responsiveness to unexpected rewards predicted the
severity of depression across both unipolar and bipolar depressed groups (Satterthwaite et
al., unpublished). Will specific computational deficits in reinforcement learning tasks
capture this aspect of reward responsiveness or anhedonia across disorders, and if so, is
this linked to common ventral striatal dysfunction? A key priority for future research
should be to more closely link these neural and behavioral effects of depression, as well
as to explore these effects across a wider range of disorders where blunted reward
responsiveness is a key component, including across mood disorders (unipolar and
bipolar depression) and psychotic disorders that share the common symptom of
anhedonia (Gold, Waltz, Prentice, Morris, & Heerey, 2008; Waltz, Frank, Robinson, &
Gold, 2007).
The results need to be interpreted in light of a couple of limitations. Though many
patients were referred from depression clinics, we do not have inter-rater reliability for
the depression diagnosis. We did not look at treatment and drug effects. Although we did
not screen out individuals comorbid with bipolar, substance abuse and/or psychotic
symptoms, we did not take other co-morbidity issues into account. Though we matched
the groups on IQ, we did not include IQ in the analyses. Working memory, another
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potential confound, was also not measured in the present study. There may be other,
unmeasured, confounds that differ between the two groups.
In addition, the current research does not address the causal relationship between
depression and reward learning. The current study establishes an association, but whether
impaired reward learning is a pre-existing risk factor for depression or an effect of
depression remains unanswered. Future research could address this question with
longitudinal studies or treatment studies. Longitudinal studies would track reward
learning performance and onset of depression over a period of time to determine whether
the onset of depressive symptoms leads to reward learning impairment or whether
impaired reward learning prefaces depressive symptoms. An unselected sample would be
necessary to carry out this study. Treatment studies would measure reward learning
impairment pre and post treatment of depression. An improvement in reward learning
performance for individuals with depressive symptoms in remission would imply
depression causes reward learning impairment as opposed to vice versa (Pizzagelli et al.,
2013).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research aimed to understand the scope of decision making in
psychopathology. Study 1 answered the basic question of whether or not decision-making
is impaired in mental illness populations. Two meta-analyses were conducted of studies
that used the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to assess value-based decision-making in mental
illness populations. In the first meta-analysis we compared IGT performance in healthy
populations and populations with mental illness. In the second meta-analysis we
examined raw IGT performance scores as a function of type of mental illness. The first
meta-analysis demonstrated that individuals with mental illness performed significantly
worse than healthy control individuals. The second meta-analysis demonstrated no
performance differences based on disorder type. These findings suggest that value-based
decision-making is a promising target for transdiagnostic analyses of processes that go
awry in mental illness but is not sensitive enough to differentiate within disorders.
Study 2 aimed to address two objectives based on the performance of a clinical
sample of MDD patients on a number of value-based decision-making tasks. First, we
wanted to identify potential dimensions of decision making worth further investigation,
and, second, to assess whether decision-making could serve as a potential predictive
diagnostic tool. Depressed individuals’ decision-making performance was found to be
significantly different across a range of decision tasks. Of the decision tasks, punishment
learning and a pessimism bias were significant predictors of depression. Decision tasks
significantly predict depression but are far outperformed by self-report measures as
predictive diagnostic tools. Overall results suggest decision tasks could function as
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identifying processes gone awry rather than diagnostic prediction of psychopathology.
Thus decision-making may serve as identifying behavioral signatures of psychopathology
such as learning and bias in depressed individuals.
Based on the results of study 2 and literature supporting impaired reinforcement
learning in clinical depression, study 3 examined the underlying causes of impaired
reinforcement-based learning in depressed patients using computational reinforcement
learning models. From a performance perspective, the results suggest that depression is
characterized by a hyposensitivity to reward and not hypersensitivity to punishment. The
computational model analyses led to two important findings. First, model free
reinforcement learning best accounted for learning in depressed individuals while modelbased learning best explained choice behavior of control individuals. Second, depressed
individuals had a significantly lower learning rate than controls. These results are
promising for the emerging field of computational psychiatry and demonstrate the
potential and scope of using decision-making to understand and explain psychopathology
from a behavioral perspective.
The above series of studies extends the current state-of-art in a number of ways.
Study 1 quantitatively reviewed and demonstrated that decision-making is indeed
impaired in mental illness populations. Interestingly enough, no differences were detected
within the mental illness populations. This was surprising given the severity and range of
population from unipolar depression to psychotic disorders and personality disorders.
However, the mental illness group did perform better than organic lesion populations as
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expected. Overall from an NIMH process perspective, decision-making may be
considered a potential candidate worth further investigation within disorders.
The lack of within mental illness group differences was addressed somewhat in
study 2 by investigating a number of value based decision-making tasks within a specific
disorder. Our goal was to determine whether decision-making could be treated as one
process or whether there were dimensions within the process that would further delineate
areas of potential impairment in decision-making for a specific population, in this case
clinical depression. We found depressed individuals performed significantly differently
across a range of decision-making tasks but certain tasks resulted in more robust
differences than others. Reinforcement learning, social decision-making and bias were
the strongest contenders. Not surprisingly there is research evidence supporting these
findings specifically in depressed individuals.
Investigating the underlying causes of reinforcement learning impairment lead to
study 3. Studies have demonstrated that possible reasons for impairment could be
cognitive deficits or hyper responsivity to punishment or hypo responsivity to reward.
Through computational reinforcement modeling we found model free reinforcement
learning explained the depressed group choices while model-based reinforcement
learning best explained the control group choices. This suggests that the stress of
depression could potentially lead to the inability to use more optimal model-based
learning strategies. Running multiple models robustly showed the depressed individuals
have a lower learning rate suggesting a hyposensitivity to reward.
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These findings have implications for current trends in psychopathology research,
which is moving away from a symptom-based approach to defining mental illness and
moving towards a more process-based one, as prominently exemplified by the RDoC
project. However, RDoC advocates for an even more radical approach to studying
decision-making and psychopathology than that used in the current study. Instead of the
outcome measure being clinically diagnosed depression, RDoC advocates for abandoning
clinical categories. What replaces these categories as outcome measures, whether
biological correlates or specific behavioral measures or general measures of daily
functioning, remains an open question.
Leykin, Roberts and DeRubeis (2011) found that the failure to use adaptive
decision-making strategies spontaneously is an important factor in determining the poor
quality of the choices made by depressed individuals, and that prompting the use of such
strategies improves decision-making considerably. One thing this result suggests is that
some deficits in decision-making in depressed individuals might disappear when
depressed individuals are sufficiently motivated or expend sufficient effort. Though lack
of motivation would be hard to definitively rule out as an explanation for the current
results, real incentives were used in the current study to equalize motivation as much as
possible. Perhaps more importantly though, the results of Leykin and colleagues suggest
that some decision making deficits in depressed individuals can be remediated, a prospect
that should be explored in future research using the current decision making tasks.
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Overall the three studies highlighted a number of key points. First decisionmaking is a process worth using as a tool for investigating mental illness. The feasibility
of using decision-making as predictive classification tools, though, seems tentative at
best. However, process-based research along with computational modeling could
quantitatively explain behavior in a more objective and empirically way than self-reports
have so far addressed. Future research investigating brain activation along with
behavioral performance would further consolidate findings, as would treatment studies
that follow decision-making performance in depressed individuals over the course of
treatment. In conclusion decision-making is definitely a process worth investigating in
mental illness populations as exemplified within a clinically depressed sample.
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TABLES
Table 1
Characteristics of Studies Assessing Decision-making Performance in Clinical Population using the IGT

Study name

Clinical
Type

Disorder
Type

Diagnosis

N

Adida et al. 2008
Adida et al.2011
Barry & Petry, 2008
Bechara et al. 1994
Bechara et al. 2001
Boeka & Lokken, 2006
Bolla et al. 2003
Bolla et al. 2005
Borges et al. 2011
Brogan et al. 2010
Cavedini et al. 2001
Cavedini et al. 2002
Cavedini et al. 2004
Cavedini et al. 2010
Choi et al. 2011
Clark et al. 2001
Clark et al. 2003
Da Rocha et al. 2011
Davis, 2011
Dolan et al.2007*
Dom, et al. 2007*
Easton et al. 2008
Evans et al. 2005
Forbush et al. 2008
Fridberg et al. 2010
Gonzalez-Blanch et al. 2008

Psych
Psych
Psych
Lesion
Lesion
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Lesion
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych

Mood
Mood
Sub
Frontal
Frontal
ED
Sub
Sub
Anx
ED
PG
Anx
ED
Anx
Schiz
MD
Frontal
Anx
ED
Sub
Sub
Sub
Schiz
PG
Sub
Schiz

BiPolar
BiPolar
Multiple
Frontal
Frontal
BN
Cocaine
Marijuana
OCD
BN and AN
PG
OCD
AN
OCD
Schiz
BiPolar
Frontal
OCD
BED
Multiple
Alcohol
Alcohol
Schiz
PG
Marijuana
Schiz

90
195
168
50
45
40
26
22
118
59
60
68
141
66
48
45
62
214
191
68
91
25
38
59
32
91
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Intelligence
Assessment

Intelligence
Significant

Substance
Abuse
Exclusion

TBI
Exclusion

No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NA
No
No
NA
No
No
No
No
Yes
NA
No
NA
NA
NA
No
Yes
No
No
NA
NA
NR
Yes
NR
Yes
No
Yes

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Hedge’s g
-1.08
-0.57
-0.49
-1.50
-1.05
-0.92
-0.32
-1.16
-0.15
-0.94
-1.24
-0.95
-0.94
-1.44
-0.06
-0.79
-1.09
-0.63
-0.24
-3.15
-2.28
-1.53
0.00
0.00
-0.95
-0.04

Grant et al. 2000
Grisham et al. 2007
Guillaume et al. 2010
Haaland & Landro 2007
Hanson et al. 2008
Jollant et al. 2005
Kertzman et al. 2011
Kjome et al. 2010
Lane et al. 2010.
Lawrence et al. 2006
Liao et al. 2009
Linnet et al 2011
Linnet et al. 2006
Loeber et al. 2009
MacPherson et al. 2009
Malloy Diniz et al. 2009
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2011
Manes et al. 2002
Martino et al. 2007
Martino et al. 2011
Maurex et al. 2009
Mazas et al.2000
Miranda et al. 2009
Must et al. 2006
Nakamura et al. 2008
Nielen et al. 2002
Petry et al. 1998
Pirastu et al. 2006
Premkumar et al. 2008
Premkumar et al. 2010
Raffard et al. 2011
Ritter et al. 2004
Rodríguez-Sánchez et al. 2005
Salgado et al. 2009
Sevy et al. 2007
Shirayama et al. 2010
Shurman et al. 2005

Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Lesion
Psych
Psych
Lesion
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych

Sub
Anx
ED
PD
Sub
MD
PG
Sub
Sub
Anx
ED
PG
PG
Sub
Frontal
MD
MD
Frontal
Schiz
MD
PD
PD
Sub
MD
Schiz
Anx
Sub
Sub
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Sub
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz

Multiple
OCD
BN and AN
BPD
Multiple
BiPolar
PG
Cocaine
Cocaine
OCD
BN
PG
PG
Alcohol
Frontal
BiPolar
BiPolar
Frontal
Schiz
BiPolar
BPD
ASPD
Alcohol
MDD
Schiz
OCD
Heroin
Opiate
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz
Alcohol
Schiz
Schiz
Schiz

54
60
170
35
81
107
108
86
33
79
77
30
100
84
38
89
189
32
36
119
78
53
60
50
49
53
93
69
100
45
128
35

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

61
102
47
37
49

88

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
NA
Yes
No
No
No
NA
NA
No
NA
No
No
No
No
No
NA
No
Yes
NA
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
NR
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
NA

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.60
-0.15
0.00
-1.49
-0.54
-0.29
-0.65
-0.81
-0.70
-0.02
-0.50
0.00
-0.34
-0.02
-0.89
-1.09
-0.69
-1.28
-0.60
-0.04
-0.37
-1.10
-0.72
-1.35
-0.76
0.00
-0.38
-0.67
-0.48
-0.47
-0.46
-0.74
-0.94
-0.13
-0.35
-0.43
-1.54

Starcke et al. 2010
Vadhan et al. 2009
Van Toor et al. 2011
Wesley et al. 2011
Woicik et al. 2009
Xi et al. 2011
Yip et al. 2009
Zhang et al. 2011

Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Psych
Lesion
Psych
Psych

Anx
Sub
Sub
Sub
Sub
Frontal
Schiz
Sub

OCD
Cocaine
Multiple
Marijuana
Cocaine
Frontal
Schiz
Heroin

45
46
62
32
90
46
63
39

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
NA
No
No
No
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

-1.07
-1.09
-0.94
-0.28
-0.08
-0.92
-0.70
-0.64

Note. Anx = Anxiety Disorders, AN = Anorexia Nervosa, BED = Binge Eating Disorder, BN = Bulimia Nervosa, ED = Eating Disorders, Lesion = Frontal Lobe Lesions or Ventro
Medial Lesions, TBI = Traumatic Brain Injury, Sub = Substance Abuse and/or Dependence, Mood = Mood , PG = Pathological Gambling , Frontal = Frontal Lobe Lesion, PD =
Personality Disorders, OCD = Obsessive Compulsive , BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder, ASPD = Anti Social Personality Disorder, NA = Not Applicable, NR = Not Reported
MD= Mood Disorder, NR = Not Reported, Schiz = Schizophrenia, Multiple = Multiple Substance Use, MDD = Major Depressive Disorder, * = study excluded as an outlier.
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Table 2
Characteristics of Studies Reporting Raw Mean IGT Performance in Clinical Populations
Study Name

Disorder Type

Diagnosis

N

Mean IGT
Performance

SE

45
-1.50
3.94
Mood
Bipolar
34
-6.72
2.49
Substance
Polysubstance
88
-1.10
2.75
Gambling
Pathological Gambling
131
2.30
1.76
Substance
Polysubstance
6
-25.5
11.54
Lesion
Frontal
19
-20.67
6.76
Lesion
Frontal
10
-10.60
2.4
Lesion
Frontal
11
8.47
4.37
Substance
Marijuana
13
6.17
7.13
Substance
Cocaine
101
-3.71
2.08
Anxiety
OCD
41
-1.07
3.26
Lesion
Frontal
49
-2.29
1.77
Anxiety
OCD
107
-4.96
1.24
Anxiety
OCD
85
3.92
2.85
Eating Disorder
Binge Eating Disorder
38
-2.10
1.26
Substance
Polysubstance
38
2.40
0.83
Substance
Alcohol
70
-1.10
3.12
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
30
10.20
4.70
Disorders
Substance
Polysubstance
30
5.28
1.20
Anxiety
OCD
20
-9.85
5.44
Personality
Borderline Personality
25
9.20
5.12
Disorders
Disorder
Mood
Bipolar
66
0.09
2.77
Substance
Cocaine
61
-0.31
3.13
Gambling
Pathological Gambling
48
0.90
1.16
Substance
Alcohol
36
-1.03
4.34
Mood
Bipolar
95
3.89
2.49
Mood
Bipolar
21
0.76
6.12
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
48
18.90
4.03
Disorders
Personality
Borderline Personality
21
2.95
3.79
Disorders
Disorder
Personality
Anti
Social Personality
6
-3.10
1.22
Disorders
Disorder
Mood
Major
Depressive
39
1.43
3.28
Disorder
Substance
Alcohol
24
-3.83
5.54
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
48
11.30
0.91
Disorders
Substance
Opioid
75
4.45
1.39
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
30
2.80
2.16
Disorders
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
20
-5.20
4.41
Disorders
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
80
-1.63
3.09
Disorders
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
31
1.03
2.62
Disorders
Substance
Alcohol
27
-5.00
3.46
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
19
-4.74
3.10
Disorders
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
39
1.90
3.01
Disorders
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
23
-1.50
5.62
Disorders
Anxiety
OCD
31
-3.46
4.73
Substance
Polysubstance
16
-3.38
2.18
Substance
Marijuana
42
5.20
4.17
Psychotic
Schizophrenia
Note. IGT = Iowa Gambling Task, OCD
Disorders
= Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, SE = Standard Error of Mean IGT Scores, * = study

Adida et al. 2008
Alfonso et al. 2011
Alvarez-Moya et al. 2011
Barry & Petry, 2008
Bechara et al., 1994
Bechara et al., 1999
Bechara et al., 2000
Bolla et al. 2005
Bolla et al. 2003
Borges et al. 2011
Clark et al., 2003
da Rocha et al. 2008
da Rocha et al. 2011
Davis et al., 2011
Dolan et al. 2007
Dom et al. 2007
Gonzalez-Blanch et al.
2008 et al. 2000
Grant
Grisham et al. 2007
Haaland & Landro 2007
Jollant et al. 2005
Kjome et al. 2010
Linnet et al. 2006
Loeber et al. 2009
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2009
Malloy-Diniz et al. 2011
Martino et al. 2007
Maurex et al 2009*
Mazas et al. 2000
McNeely et al. 2008
Miranda et al. 2009
Nakamura et al. 2008
Pirastu et al. 2006
Premkumar et al. 2008
Premkumar et al. 2010
Ritter et al. 2004
Rodriguez-Sanchez et al.
2005 et al. 2009
Salgado
Sevy et al. 2007
Shirayama et al. 2010
Shurman et al. 2005
Starcke et al. 2010
van Toor et al. 2011
Wesley et al. 2011
Yip et al. 2009

excluded as an outlier.
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Table 3
Analyses of Moderation for the Between Group IGT studies
Moderator

n

Diagnosis

63

Hedge’s g

95% CI

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder

8

-0.54**

-0.81 to -0.26

Eating Disorder

6

-0.53**

-0.84 to -0.21

Mood Disorder

8

-0.70***

-0.98 to -0.44

Pathological Gambling Disorder

5

-0.46

-0.82 to 0.10

Personality Disorders

3

-0.90**

-1.39 to -0.41

Substance Dependence Disorder

19

-0.63***

-0.82 to -0.44

Schizophrenia

14

-0.45***

-0.68 to -0.23

Non-personality vs. Personality

63

Non-personality disorder

60

-0.56***

-0.66 to -0.46

Personality Disorder

3

-0.90***

-1.38 to -0.42

Intelligence Assessment

63

No

13

-0.86***

-1.07 to -0.65

Yes

50

-0.51***

-0.61 to -0.40

Intelligence Significant

50

Yes

18

-0.53***

-0.71 to -0.35

No

30

-0.52***

-0.66 to -0.39

63
2
25

-0.15
-0.58***

-0.64.to .33
-0.74 to -0.41

38

-0.60***

-0.74 to -0.47

Substance Use Exclusion
Not reported
Yes
No
TBI/Neuropsychological Deficits
Exclusion
Yes
No
Administration of IGT

63
32

-0.58***

-0.73 to -0.43

31

-0.60***

-0.75 to -0.46

63

Computer

51

-0.56***

-0.67 to -0.44

Hand

12

-0.72***

-1.00 to -0.45

Clinical Population

69

Lesion

6

-1.10***

-1.48 to -0.72

Mental Illness

63

-0.58***

-0.67 to -0.48

Note. n= number of studies, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Q (df)

p

4.6 (6)

0.60

1.79 (1)

0.18

8.58(1)

0.003**

2.4(1)

0.35

1.08 (1)

0.58

1.06 (1)

0.60

1.40(1)

0.50

6.57 (1)

0.01**

Table 4
Analyses of Moderation for the Mean Performance IGT studies
Moderator

n

Disorder

40

Effect Size

95% CI

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder

5

-1.35

-0.97 to -0.09

Eating Disorder

1

3.92

-0.70 to 14.86

Mood Disorder

5

0.9

-4.25 to 6.04

Pathological Gambling

2

-0.72

-1.18 to 0.14

Personality Disorders

2

-2.37

-11.54 to 6.80

Substance Dependence

14

1.72

-1.2 to 4..64

Schizophrenia

11

-0.28

-3.8 to 3.24

Non-personality vs. Personality

40

Non-personality Disorder

38

0.57

-1.19 to 2.32

Personality Disorder

2

-2.33

-11.34 to 6.67

Clinical Group

44

Lesions

4

-14.12

-19.74 to -8.49

Mental Illness

40

0.45

-1.35 to 2.26

Note. n= number of studies, ***p < 0.001
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Q (df)

p

2.32(6)

0.9

0.38 (1)

0.54

23.35 (1)

<0.001***

Table 5
Demographic Characteristics
Depressed
N

%

Control
N

%

27
37

57.8
42.2

33
31

51.6
48.4

34
24
4
2

53.1
37.5
6.2
3.1

33
23
7
1

51.6
35.9
10.9
1.6

4
26
10
12
11
0

6.3
41.3
15.9
19
17.5
0

1
23
12
16
9
3

1.6
35.9
18.8
25
14.1
4.7

29
33
1

45.3
51.6
1.6

0
63
1

0
98.4
1.6

33
29
1

51.6
45.3
1.6

2
61
1

2.31
95.3
1.6

M
40.45
101.32
30.03

SD
13.48
14.63
10.46

M
38.53
103.7
2.9

SD
11.73
14.1
4.32

Gender
Male
Female
Ethnicity
African American
Caucasian
Asian
Other
Education
No High School Diploma
High School
Diploma/Technical
Associate’s Degree
Training Degree
Bachelor's
Master's Degree
Doctoral Degree
On Medication
Yes
No
Not Reported
In Therapy
Yes
No
Not Reported

Age
WASI
BDI

Significance
p value
.3

.76

.31

<.001**

<.001**

Note. ** = p < .001
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p value
.4
.35
<.001**

Table 6
Decision Task Performance in Depressed and Control Groups
Decision Task

Measure

Depressed

Control

p value

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

Risk Uncertainty
Risk

Safe Choices (%)

56.69

23.07

63

59.12

22.34

64

.55

Ambiguity

50-50 Choices (%)

59.30

26.14

64

68.06

22.64

64

.05*

Reward

Rich Choices (%)

59.59

9.84

61

63.21

10.80

63

.05*

Punishment

Rich Choices (%)

41.51

9.93

61

35.44

10.81

63

.001**

Proposer

Minimum for Self ($)

5.39

0.79

64

5.78

1.27

64

.04*

Responder

Minimum for Self ($)

2.95

1.70

64

3.58

1.55

64

.03*

Prediction

Probability in %

54.08

23.60

60

64.03

20.46

62

.01*

Winnings

Amount in $

33.74

27.15

60

31.35

21.78

62

.60

Now Choices (%)

67.16

24.89

64

71.06

23.36

64

.36

Block A (in secs)

13.77

2.82

64

14.74

2.06

63

.03

Block B (in secs)

12.83

3.54

63

12.87

3.98

64

.96

Learning Task

Ultimatum Game

Negative Bias

Temporal Tasks
Delay Discounting
Persistence

Note. * p < .05 and ** p = .001
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Table 7
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal axis factoring analysis with
promax rotation for ten value-based decision-making tasks (N = 116)
Myopia

Persistence

Uncertainty

Bias

Communality

Punishment: Rich Choice

.71

.55

Reward: Rich Choice

.80

.63

Now Choices

- .36

.20

BlockBmin1sec

.85

.32

BlockAmin1sec

.60

.76

Safe Choices

.48

.21

50-50 Choices

.82

.70

Winning Probability

.70

.48

Propose for Self

.22

.10

-.21

.08

Accept for Self
Note. Factor loadings < .2 are suppressed.
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Table 8
Eigenvalues from Parallel Analysis of Decision Making Variables
Factor

Actual Eigenvalues

Average Eigenvalues

for Current Data

for Random Data

1

1.28

.76

2

1.01

.53

3

.54

.39

4

.23

.28

5

.13

.15

6

-.06

.06

7

-.12

-.03

8

-.16

-.12

9

-.30

-.19

10

-.31

-.26

Note. Factors above dotted line were retained in parallel analysis.
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Table 9
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Factor Scores Predicting Depressed and
Healthy Individuals

Myopia
Persistence
Uncertainty
Bias
Constant

B

S.E.

Wald

Sig.

Exp (B)

-.58
.147
.464
.544
.147

.256
.281
.269
.317
.281

5.063
.275
2.980
2.944
.275

.024
.600
.084
.086
.600

.562
1.159
1.590
1.724
1.159
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95% C.I. for EXP(B)
Lower
Upper
0.00
6.904E+245
0.00
1.819E+145
0.00
.
0.00
.

Table 10
Factor loadings and communalities based on a principal axis factoring analysis with
promax rotation for four self-reports (10 including sub-scales) measuring components of
depression (N = 125)
Negative

Positive

Communalities

CS
BS

.95
.90

.77
.85

BNS

.94

.87

CNS

.94

.82

Snaith-Hamilton

-.64

.66

BIS

.54

.34

Self-Esteem

-.53

.40

Reward Responsiveness BAS

.77

.55

Fun Seeking BAS

.83

.70

Drive BAS

.58

.43

Note. Factor loadings < .4 are suppressed. BNS = Behavioral Non-Social avoidance, CS =
Cognitive Social avoidance, BS = Behavioral Social avoidance, CNS = Cognitive Non-Social
avoidance, BIS = Behavioral Inhibition Scale, BAS = Behavioral Approach Scale.
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Table 11
Eigenvalues from Parallel Analysis of Self-Report Variables
Factor

Actual Eigenvalues

Average Eigenvalues

for Current Data

for Random Data

1

8.86

.95

2

1.20

.73

3

.56

.60

4

.29

.47

5

.17

.37

6

.14

.28

7

.03

.21

8

.01

.12

9

-.02

.05

10

-.03

-.02

Note. Factors above dotted line were retained in parallel analysis.
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Table 12
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Self Report Factor Scores Predicting
Depression and Healthy Controls
B

S.E.

Wald

Sig.

Exp (B)

Negative
Positive

-4.23
.56

.86
.55

24.16
1.03

.00
.31

.01
1.75

Constant

-1.10

.50

4.71

.03

.34

100

95% C.I. for EXP(B)
Lower

Upper

.003
.59

.08
5.20

Table 13
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Decision Task Variables Predicting
Depression and Healthy Controls
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Safe Choices
Now Choices

.00
.01

.01
.01

.13
.27

1
1

.72
.60

1.00
1.01

.98
.99

1.02
1.03

50-50 Choice

-.01

.01

1.10

1

.30

.99

.97

1.01

Reward: Rich Choice

.01

.03

.31

1

.58

1.01

.97

1.07

Punishment: Rich Choice

-.06

.03

5.66

1

.02*

.94

.90

.99

Minimum Accept

.28

.14

3.73

1

.05*

1.32

1.00

1.74

Minimum Propose

.24

.22

1.12

1

.29

1.27

.82

1.97

Winning Probability

.02

.01

3.15

1

.08^

1.02

1.00

1.04

Block
A (min1sec)
Prediction
Block B (min1sec)

.15

.13

1.39

1

.24

1.16

.91

1.50

-.06

.07

.88

1

.35

.94

.82

1.07

Constant

-3.32

3.27

1.03

1

.31

.04

Note. * = p ≤ .05, ^ p = .08
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95% C.I.for EXP (B)

Table 14
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for significant Decision Variables Predicting
Depressed and Healthy Individuals
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% C.I. for

Punishment
MinimumAccept

-.062
.312

.020
.137

9.647
5.172

1
1

.002*
.023*

.940
1.366

LowerEXP(B)
Upper
.904
.977
1.044
1.787

WinningProbability

.023

.010

5.625

1

.018*

1.023

1.004

Constant

.074

1.058

.005

1

.944

1.077

Note. * = p < .05
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1.043

Table 15
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Self Report Predicting Depression and
Healthy Controls
B

S.E.

Wald

Sig.

Exp (B)

-.18
-.17

.14
.22

1.78
.63

.18
.43

.83
.84

CNS Total

.07

.15

.18

.67

1.07

CS Total

-.02

.11

.03

.86

.98

BAS: Drive

.04

.16

.06

.80

1.04

BAS: Fun Seeking

-.03

.28

.01

.92

.97

BAS:Reward

-.12

.24

.24

.62

.88

BIS
Responsiveness
Snaith-Hamilton

-.25

.15

2.84

.09^

.77

.13

.07

2.94

.08^

1.13

.42

.24

3.02

.08^

1.52

-6.27

7.93

.63

.43

.002

BS Total
BNS Total

Self-Esteem
Constant
Note. ^ < .09
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Table 16
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for Trending Self-Report Variables Predicting
Depression and Healthy Controls

BIS
Snaith Hamilton
Self-Esteem
Constant

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp (B)

Lower

Upper

-.32
.20

.12
.06

6.78
12.58

1
1

.009*
.000*

.72
1.22

.57
1.09

.923
1.36

.56

.19

8.79

1

.003*

1.76

1.21

2.55

17.57

5.78

9.22

1

.002

.000

Note. * = p < .01
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Table 17
Demographic Characteristics
Depressed

Control

Significance

N

%

N

%

Male

27

57.8

33

51.6

Female

37

42.2

31

48.4

Gender

p value
0.3

Ethnicity

0.76
African American

34

53.1

33

51.6

Caucasian

24

37.5

23

35.9

Asian

4

6.2

7

10.9

Other

2

3.1

1

1.6

Education

0.31

No High School Diploma

4

6.3

1

1.6

High School Diploma/Technical
Training
Associates Degree

26

41.3

23

35.9

10

15.9

12

18.8

Bachelor's Degree

12

19

16

25

Master's Degree

11

17.5

9

14.1

Doctoral Degree

0

0

3

4.7

On Medication

<.001**

Yes

29

45.3

0

0

No

33

51.6

63

98.4

Not Reported

1

1.6

1

1.6

Yes

33

51.6

2

2.31

No

29

45.3

61

95.3

Not Reported

1

1.6

1

1.6

M

SD

M

SD

p value

Age
WASI

40.45
101.32

13.48
14.63

38.53
103.7

11.73
14.1

0.4
0.35

BDI

30.03

10.46

2.9

4.32

<.001

In Therapy

<.001**

Note. ** = p < .001
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Table 18
Model free vs. model based RL
Model Free

Model Based

BIC

BIC

Combined

12941.91

12933.34

Controls

6225.36

6111.45

MDD

6708.57

6764.83

13307.75 13212.10

13212.10

Controls

6343.44

6197.60

MDD

6924.08

6935.08

Rewards

Punishment
Combined

Note. The bold values indicate the best fit statistics
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Table 19
Comparison of model fit based on parameters in the RL model
Model Free

Model Based

BIC

BIC

No difference between MDD and Controls

12941.91

12933.34

Different Stimulus Learning Rates

12910.06

12872.44

Different Action Learning Rates

12951.01

12942.66

Different Persistence

12948.90

12933.91

Different Bias

12951.22

12942.64

No difference between MDD and Controls

13307.75

13212.10

Different Stimulus Learning Rates

13261.16

13150.41

Different Action Learning Rates

13308.60

13215.37

Different Persistence

13309.25

13205.42

Different Bias

13315.63

13219.08

Reward Learning

Punishment Learning

Note. The bold values indicate the best fit statistics

107

FIGURES

Figure 1. Flow chart illustrating identification of included studies for IGT between group metaanalysis.
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Figure 2. Flow chart illustrating identification of included studies for mean IGT performance
meta-analysis.
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Figure 3. Effect Size Meta-analysis Funnel Plot.
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Figure 4. Raw Score Meta-analysis Funnel Plot.
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Values Indicate Impairment)
(Negative

Effect Size

Severity of Impairment Based on Disorder
-1.4
Non Personality Disorders ( n=60)

-1.2

Personality Disorder ( n=3)
Frontal Lobe Lesions ( n =6)

-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0

Figure 5. Poor performance on IGT as a function of clinical group, Non Personality Disorders <
Personality Disorders < Frontal Lobe Lesions.
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Figure 6. Scree plot for decision task factor analysis indicating a four-factor structure.
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Figure 7. Scree plot for self-report factor analysis indicating a two-factor structure.
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Figure 8. Sequence of events in A. Reward Learning Task and B. Punishment Learning Task.
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Figure 9. A. Average proportion of rich choices for the depressed and control group in the
punishment and reward learning tasks. * denotes p = <.05. B. Average proportion of choosing
fractal 1 across 90 trials for the depressed and control group in reward learning task. C. Same data
as B for the punishment learning task. The shaded areas indicate trials between which depressed
group performed significantly worse than control group.
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Figure 10. A. Proportion of win-stay, lose-shift, win-stay same side, win-stay different side, loseshift same side and lose-shift different side choices in punishment learning task, * p < .05. B.
Proportion of win-stay, lose-shift, win-stay same side, win-stay different side, lose-shift same side
and lose-shift different side choices in reward learning task, * p < .05.
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Figure 11. A. Choice behavior as a linear function of reward feedback 10 trials back. B. Choice
behavior as a linear function of no punishment feedback 10 trials back.
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